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Foreign Language Effects on Judgment and Decision Making 
 
Abstract 
I present four studies in which my coauthors and I investigated whether presenting 
information in a foreign language, as opposed to the native language, influences 
judgment and decision-making. Research on judgment and decision-making suggests 
that there are two routes to judgment and choice: an intuitive, emotional route and an 
analytic, controlled route. Research on bilingualism suggests that the use of a foreign 
language influences the intuitive route. It attenuates emotions and dampens the 
activation of moral and sociocultural norms. Merging these lines of research, my 
coauthors and I predicted that foreign language would influence judgment and 
decision-making. We found that it influences moral judgment through a deactivation 
of moral norms, and that it affects the perception of risk and benefit through an 
attenuation of negative feelings. I discuss the theoretical and practical significance of 
the present findings, and point out limitations and possible future developments of 
this research area. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The use of a foreign language has become a commonplace activity for millions 
of people in our globalized society. People, for example, share their lives with 
romantic partners who do not speak their native language, and work in international 
companies that implement common language policies. As a result, people frequently 
engage in verbal and written communications, such as discussions, reports, or emails, 
in a foreign language. This essay explores whether processing printed information in a 
foreign language, as opposed to a native language, influences judgment and decision-
making in the domains of moral reasoning and risk perception. By foreign language, 
as I will use the term, I denote a language that is learned and used “outside the 
environment where the majority of the speakers use it as a native language” 
(Pavlenko, 2012, p. 407).  
The fashion photographer Helmut Newton, born and raised in Berlin, 
Germany, once had the opportunity to meet the former German chancellor for dinner. 
But Helmut Newton confused the dates and showed up a day later. In his handwritten 
apology letter he stated, “I am too upset to write in German. I can only think in 
English at this moment and I don’t expect to ever be forgiven.” Helmut Newton’s 
comment illustrates that the use of a foreign language may trigger psychological 
distance. This could be because the use of a foreign language attenuates emotion (for 
reviews see, Pavlenko, 2012; Caldwell-Harris, 2014, 2015). Helmut Newton 
presumably felt embarrassed and angry with himself. By writing (thinking) in a 
foreign language he attenuated the negativity of those feelings. It could also be that 
relevant sociocultural norms, such as keeping promises and coming to appointments, 
are less salient when thinking in a foreign language (see e.g., Gawinkowska, 
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Paradowski, & Bilewicz, 2013). By thinking in a foreign language, Helmut Newton’s 
norm violation became more bearable. But why should emotion attenuation and/ or a 
suppression of sociocultural norms influence judgment and decision-making?  
Theories of judgment and decision-making advocate dual-process models 
(e.g., Evans, 1989, 2007; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich,1999, 2004, 2009; 
Sloman, 1996). According to these models judgments and decisions are the result of 
two types of psychological processes: one which is intuitive, parallel, automatic, and 
unconscious and another which is controlled, serial, slow, and conscious. Importantly, 
intuition has been shown to impact judgment and decision-making through gut-
feelings and norms (Kahneman, 2011). To the extent, therefore, that foreign language 
attenuates emotions and norms it might impact judgments and choices. In the present 
essay I provide empirical support for this hypothesis. I will show that the use of a 
foreign language influences moral judgment by reducing access to relevant 
sociocultural and moral norms. I will also show that it influences risk and benefit 
perception through affect.  
In the remainder of Chapter 1, I will review research on bilingualism 
concerning emotion and norm activation. I will also review theories of judgment and 
decision-making in the domains of moral judgment and risk and benefit perception. 
The purpose of Chapter 1 is to give an overview of the theoretical basis of the present 
research. Chapters 2, 3, and 5 are reproductions of research articles that I published 
during my doctoral studies (Geipel, Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2015; Geipel, 
Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2015; Hadjichristidis, Geipel, & Savadori, 2015) while 
Chapter 3 is a reproduction of a research article that is currently under review. 
Chapter 6 is a general discussion in which I summarize the results and arguments in 
this essay. In Chapter 6, I also allude to practical implications of the present findings. 
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Research on foreign language processing 
More than 100 years ago, Freud noticed that the use of foreign language might 
trigger emotional distance. He discussed the case of a multilingual patient, Anna O., 
who lost her mother tongue for eighteen months and spoke only in her foreign 
languages (Freud, 1893). Later in the 1990s, applied psycholinguistics investigated 
the relationship between bilingualism and emotion by conducting one of the largest 
online surveys to date (Dewaele, 2008; Pavlenko, 2005). Based on 1579 respondents, 
these researchers found that emotional sentences, such as “I love you”, were 
perceived as more emotional when printed in the native language rather than in a 
foreign language. Similar results were found for taboo and swear words. In the 
context of consumer research, Puntoni and colleagues (Puntoni, de Langhe, & van 
Osselaer, 2009) studied the emotional intensity of marketing slogans, such as “Parents 
who use drugs have kids who use drugs.” Participants perceived the slogans as more 
emotional when these were printed in their native language.  
Laboratory experiments further supported these self-report findings. For 
example, Bond and Lai (1986) found that native Chinese speakers discussed longer 
about embarrassing topics in a foreign language (English) as compared to their native 
language. Bond and Lai explained their findings by suggesting that foreign language 
acts as a distancing mechanism. Harris and colleagues (Harris, Ayçiçegi, & Gleason, 
2003) presented (auditorially) childhood reprimands, such as “Shame on you” and 
“Don’t do that”, either in the participants’ native language (Turkish) or in a foreign 
language (English). They found that childhood reprimands elicited stronger skin 
conductance reactions when they were presented in the native language as opposed to 
a foreign language.  
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In a different study, Caldwell-Harris and Aycicegi-Dinn (2009) presented 
participants with false-statements either in the participants’ native language (Turkish) 
or a foreign language (English). Participants who received these statements in their 
native language showed greater skin-conductance responses for false-statements with 
moral content as compared to statements with neutral content. However, this content 
related emotional difference was not found in the foreign language condition (see 
Caldwell-Harris, 2015). Foreign language blunted the physiological reactivity to both 
moral and non-moral statements. 
Although there is a wealth of studies demonstrating an emotional advantage of 
the native language, several have failed to find such a difference. One such study is 
Conrad and colleagues’ research (Conrad, Recio, & Jacobs, 2011) with native German 
and native Spanish speakers. While the participants performed a visual lexical 
decision task either in the native or a foreign language, the researchers measured the 
participants’ event related potential (ERP) waves. They found that the ERP waves 
were similar in both language conditions. This suggests that emotional words are 
processed similarly in both the native and the foreign language.  
In line with this finding, Opitz and Degner (2012) showed amplified ERP 
waves for emotional words when these were presented in either the native language 
(German or French) or a foreign language (French or German). However, while the 
ERP waves did not differ in amplitude, they differed in onset; their onset was delayed 
when the emotional words were presented in the foreign language. This suggests that 
emotional words are less automatically processed in the foreign than in the native 
language.  
One explanation for these mixed findings is that the greater emotional 
reactions related to the native language might depend on a complex interplay of 
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factors such as age of acquisition, proficiency, and context of use of the foreign 
language (e.g., Caldwell-Harris, 2015; Caldwell-Harris, Staroselsky, Smashnaya, & 
Vasilyeva, 2012; Dewaele, 2010; Puntoni et al., 2009). In other words, using and 
experiencing a foreign language in everyday life through social interactions can 
reduce the emotional differences between the native and a foreign language. For this 
reason, in the present experiments we interviewed participants who have learned the 
foreign language in a classroom context. We excluded ones who have learned it 
through immersion in a culture.  
A further source for the inconsistent findings is that the use of a foreign 
language might have opposite influence on positive and negative emotion words 
(Caldwell-Harris, 2015; Pavlenko, 2012). Specifically, it might attenuate the 
negativity of negative words, but increase (or leave unaffected) the positivity of 
positive words. Support for this claim comes from neuroscience research. Wu and 
Thierry (2012) found that positive or neutral words in the foreign language 
automatically trigger their native language translations. However, this was not the 
case for negative words. These authors claimed that negative words trigger inhibitory 
mechanisms that block access to their native language equivalents. As Wu and 
Thierry eloquently put it, foreign language protects our hearts.  
In line with this research, Sheikh and Titone (2015), using eye-tracking 
methods, demonstrated that positive words are read more quickly as compared to 
neutral words in both the native language and the foreign language. However, this 
emotional processing advantage was absent for negative words in the foreign 
language. These authors suggested that the emotional processing advantage for 
positive words in both the native and a foreign language could be because positive 
words have more opportunities in adult interaction to be emotionally grounded. In 
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contrast, negative words might have fewer opportunities for emotional grounding 
because a foreign language is typically learned at a later point in life. Critically, a 
foreign language is experienced through adult interactions that have been shown to 
exhibit a positivity bias (see the Polyanna Principle by Matlin & Stang, 1978; see also 
Dodds et al., 2015).  
 Yet another explanation of these incompatible findings comes from research 
on the use of swear words in a foreign language. Gawinkowska et al. (2013) asked 
native Polish speakers to translate passages of texts either from their native language 
into their foreign language or vice versa. These authors found that translating foreign 
language swearwords into the native language resulted into weaker swearword 
translations, whereas translating native language swear words into the foreign 
language resulted in stronger translations than in the original version. Importantly, 
this effect was confined to politically incorrect, insulting words directed against social 
groups. It was not observed for other swearwords. The authors concluded that foreign 
language does not facilitate the use of swearwords because it attenuates their 
emotionality, but rather because it inhibits the activation of relevant social norms. In a 
foreign language people are less inhibited from using ‘taboo’ swearwords.  
 Gawinkowska and colleagues’ proposal is in line with Bond and Lai’s (1986) 
research. It could be that the use of a foreign language lightens the sociocultural 
“baggage” that is associated with the native language. This would explain why people 
discuss relatively longer about embarrassing topics in a foreign as compared to their 
native language. It would also explain why swearing in a foreign language is 
perceived as less wrong, especially for ethnic groups for which the use of swear 
words is strongly stigmatized, such as for Asians (Dewaele, 2010). Furthermore, it 
could explain why psychotherapy patients preferred to use a foreign language to avoid 
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anxiety-provoking topics (Freud, 1893). Finally, it could also explain why Helmut 
Newton preferred to write his apology letter in English. 
 In sum, empirical evidence suggests that the use of a foreign language might 
attenuate emotions and in particular negative emotions. Research also shows that 
foreign language might attenuate moral and sociocultural norms. In the next two 
sections, I discuss theories of judgment and decision-making and explain how 
emotions and norms can influence these activities. In the section directly below I 
focus on moral judgment while in the following section on risk and benefit 
perception. Parts of these theories and supporting empirical evidence are covered in 
the papers presented in Chapters 2 to 5. My purpose here is to offer the reader with a 
more extensive overview.  
Intuition and reasoning in moral judgment 
How do people judge the ethicality of their own and others’ behaviours? This 
question has divided psychologists for a long time. Historically, there were two 
prevalent views. One assumed that moral judgment is the result of controlled, 
conscious processing (e.g., Piaget, 1965; Kohlberg, 1969) while another that it is the 
result of intuitive, unconscious processing (e.g., Freud, 1955). In the last decades, 
research suggests that moral judgment is the result of both intuitive and controlled 
processing, but intuition sometimes dominates.  
The social intuitionist model (e.g., Haidt, 2001) suggests that moral judgment 
is based predominantly on intuitions. These intuitions are triggered automatically by 
good or bad actions that are evaluated in relation to, for example, sociocultural and 
moral norms. In the aftermath, people can engage in controlled and conscious moral 
reasoning and may even change their initial intuitive moral response. Support for this 
model comes from studies, which show that participants judge harmless but offensive 
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actions (consensual and safe incest between siblings) as morally wrong. When the 
participants are asked to justify their moral evaluations, most are unable to provide 
justifications (e.g., Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Haidt, & Bjorklund, 2008), a 
condition known as moral dumbfounding (Haidt, Bjorklund, Murphy, 2000). This is 
interpreted as evidence that moral judgments are driven by intuition rather than by 
reason. If they were driven by reason then participants should be able to justify them. 
In contrast to Haidt’s social intuitionist model, dual process models of moral 
reasoning (e.g., Cushman, 2013; Greene, Morelli et al., 2008; Greene, Sommerville et 
al., 2001) suggest that moral judgment is the result of intuitive and controlled 
processing. Intuitive processing supports deontological type judgments, whereas 
controlled processing supports consequentialist type judgments. Deontological type 
judgments are defined as “judgments that focus on the rights and duties of others and 
are difficult to justify in consequentialist terms, such as killing one life in order to 
save a greater number of lives” (see Greene, 2014, p.7). Consequentialist type 
judgments are defined as “engaging in cost-benefit reasoning and are more difficult to 
justify in deontological terms” (see Greene, 2014, p. 8). A typical consequentialist 
type judgment in the vein of Greene’s dual process model would be killing one person 
in order to save five others.  
The dual process model of moral judgment was inspired by research on the 
trolley dilemmas. In the trolley problem participants are asked to imagine a runaway 
trolley that is about to kill five workers that are standing on the track. There is the 
possibility to hit a switch that will divert the trolley onto a different track where it will 
kill one worker but the five will be saved. Participants are asked whether it would be 
morally acceptable for them to hit the switch. In the footbridge problem the situation 
is similar but here the only way to save the five workers is to push a person off a 
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bridge and into the path of the runaway trolley. This would kill the person but save 
the five workers. Participants are asked whether it would be okay for them to push the 
person. In the trolley problem most people accept the proposed action—hitting a 
switch—thus making a consequentialist type judgment. In the footbridge problem 
most people refuse the proposed action—pushing a person—thus making a 
deontological type judgment. Why do people respond differently? 
In an attempt to explain the underlying mechanisms of people’s choices in 
these dilemmas, Greene and colleagues conducted a study using functional 
measurement resonance imaging (fMRI; Greene et al., 2001). Participants responded 
to a series of moral dilemmas, of the same type as the footbridge and the trolley 
problems, while the authors measured the participants’ neuronal activity. The results 
showed that footbridge type dilemmas increase neuronal activity in areas that are 
typically associated with social and emotional processing. In contrast, trolley type 
dilemmas increase neuronal activity in areas that are typically associated with 
working memory. These findings support the idea that deontological type judgments 
are most likely driven by intuitive processing, whereas consequentialist type judgment 
by controlled processing (but see McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, & Mackenzie, 2009). 
This idea was further supported in a series of studies examining patients with brain 
lesions in emotional centres of the brain (e.g., Ciaramelli & di Pellegrino, 2011; 
Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Làdavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; Moretto, Làdavas, Mattioli, & 
di Pellegrino, 2010; Thomas, Croft, & Tranel, 2011; Koenigs et al., 2007). These 
patients, in comparison to controls, demonstrated increased consequentialist type 
choices in response to footbridge type dilemmas.  
However, recent studies have challenged this dual process conceptualisation 
proposed by Greene and colleagues (e.g., Greene et al., 2008). Specifically, they have 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
10 
 
contested the idea that consequentialist judgments are necessarily the products of 
controlled processing. For example, Duke and Bègue (2015) demonstrated that 
alcohol intoxication is positively associated with consequentialist type judgments. 
This is surprising because alcohol intoxication is known to increase emotional 
reactivity (Euser & Franken, 2012; Giancola, Josephs, Parrott, & Duke, 2010; Ray, 
Mun, Buckman, Udo, & Bates, 2012; Sayette et al., 2012) and to deplete cognitive 
resources (Giancola, 2000), and therefore the ability to reason. The dual process 
model of moral judgment would thus predict that alcohol intoxication should promote 
deontological responses—the opposite of what these authors found! Duke and Bègue 
(2015) proposed that impaired social cognition (e.g. reduced empathy) might provide 
an alternative route to consequentialist type judgment.  
This claim is in line with research conducted by Patil and Silani (2014) on the 
relationship between reduced empathic traits and moral judgment. Patil and Silani 
(2014) found a positive relation between alexithymia, a trait associated with reduced 
empathic concern, and consequentialist judgments in footbridge type dilemmas. In a 
similar vein, Kahane and colleagues (e.g., Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 
2015) found that sub-clinical psychopathy was associated with increased 
consequentialist type judgments in ethical transgressions in a business context. This 
association was further supported by Patil (2015). Importantly, Patil (2015) found that 
the association between psychopathy and consequentialist moral judgment was 
mediated by a reduced aversion to perform harmful actions. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that consequentialist type judgments might result from increased 
controlled processing but also from impaired intuitive processing. In the present 
essay, I will claim that foreign language use influences moral judgment through the 
latter route.  
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Combining the bilingual research that I described and moral judgment 
research, my co-authors and I predicted that processing moral scenarios in a foreign 
language as compared to the native language would influence moral judgment. 
Specifically, we expected that the use of a foreign language might impair intuitive 
processing by reducing the activation of social and moral norms. We also expected 
that the use of a foreign language would deplete cognitive resources, because 
processing information in a foreign language is more difficult and less automatic than 
processing one’s native language (see Volk, Köhler, & Pudelnko, 2014). Specifically, 
in line with Duke and Bègue’s (2015) findings with alcohol-intoxicated participants, 
we expected that the use of foreign language would increase consequentialist type 
judgments in the footbridge dilemma. We also expected that it would promote 
leniency towards harmless and harmful violations of moral rules.  
In Chapter 2, we investigated whether the use of a foreign language, as 
compared to the native language, would influence the moral evaluation of the trolley 
and footbridge dilemmas. In Chapter 3, we examined whether the use of a foreign 
language influences moral judgments about moral transgressions that are harmless but 
offensive (e.g., eating one’s dead dog). In Chapter 4, we examined the effect of 
foreign language once again on offensive but harmless actions but here also on 
morally good actions. To get a glimpse of the underpinning processes, we also asked 
participants to justify their moral evaluations, and checked whether the justifications 
were of the deontological or the consequentialist type.  
Intuition and reasoning in risk judgment 
  How risky are nuclear power plants? To answer this question, many of us use 
our immediate intuitive reaction. Nuclear power plants often trigger negative 
associations, such as Chernobyl, Fukushima, or the image of death and devastation, 
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and so we judge them as risky. This is called risk as feelings. Other people may weigh 
the pros and cons of nuclear power plants and think about it in a more analytic way. 
This is called risk as analysis. The distinction between risk as feelings and risk as 
analysis, in essence, describes a dual process model of risk and benefit perception 
(see, e.g., Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). Risk as feelings is 
underpinned by intuitive processing and specifically emotions, whereas risk as 
analysis is underpinned by controlled processing.  
Robert Zajonc (e.g., Zajonc, 1980) was among the first to recognize the 
importance of affect in judgment and decision-making. He noted that almost all 
perceptions involve feelings. For example, he noted that: “We do not just see “a 
house”: We see a handsome home, an ugly house, or a pretentious house.” These 
feelings in turn guide our judgments and decisions. Zajonc (e.g., Zajonc, 1980) 
demonstrated that repeated exposure to an object generates positive attitudes towards 
that object, which is known as “the mere exposure effect.” For example, he presented 
participants with Chinese ideographs and varied the frequency of exposure. At a later 
point of the experiment, participants’ attitudes towards these Chinese ideographs were 
measured. The more frequently an ideograph was presented, the more positive the 
attitudes towards it. This effect was found to be reliable across several types of stimuli 
such as audio or visual (see Bornstein, 1989). 
In the 1990s, Antonio Damasio and colleagues (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 
Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 2005) generated a more broad interest in 
the role of feelings in judgment and decision-making. Damasio studied patients with 
damage to the ventral and medial portions of the frontal lobes, regions that are 
associated with impaired skills to express emotion and experience feelings. They 
argued that reasoning and decision-making at large depends on sensory images. Those 
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images have come to be associated with good or bad feelings through lifelong 
learning, which in turn can predict outcomes of future situations (Damasio, 1994). 
This is called the somatic marker hypothesis. Damasio argued that somatic markers 
determine the decision-making process. Crucially, if the somatic markers are absent, 
such as in the case of the brain lesion patients that Damasio studied, the decision-
making process is impaired. Damasio’s work had a huge impact in the scientific 
community as it dispelled the long held view that emotions hinder reasoning.  
Paul Slovic and colleagues (e.g., Slovic, MacGregor, Malmfors, & Purchase, 
1999; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002, 2004) extended Damasio’s 
somatic marker hypothesis and developed the affect heuristic. They argued that 
judgments and decisions are guided predominantly by mental representations that are 
associated with positive or negative affect. When making a judgment or decision, 
people consult the “affective pool” of a stimulus. In other words, they use the 
affective pool, or affective valence, as a proxy for making a judgment or decision. 
This is especially true in the case of complex decisions. Note that this is similar to the 
assumptions made by the Social Intuition Model (Haidt, 2001), which proposes that 
people use their immediate “gut feeling” to make a moral judgment.  
Fischhoff and colleagues (e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & 
Combs, 1978) provided the first empirical evidence for the affect heuristic in the 
context of risk perception. They demonstrated a negative relationship between risk 
and benefit judgments for hazards such as smoking, pesticides, or vaccination. 
Individuals judged, for example, smoking as high in risk and low in benefit, whereas 
vaccination as low in risk and high in benefit. This inverse relationship has been 
interpreted as evidence that individuals base their risk and benefit judgments on a 
hazard’s affective pool. If the affective pool is negative it signals danger, so the 
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hazard is judged as high in risk and low in benefit. If it is positive then it signals 
safety, so the hazard is judged as low in risk and high in benefit. Such judgments are 
likely to be biased because in the real world the risk and benefit of hazards are 
typically associated (if at all) positively.  
The affect heuristic was further supported in a study by Alhakami and Slovic 
(1994; see also Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000) who found that the 
affective evaluation of hazards, such as pesticides, was the major predictor of the risk 
and benefit correlation. These studies suggest that individuals base their risk and 
benefit judgments not only on analytic thinking, but also on their feelings on how they 
feel about the hazard. Finucane and colleagues call this “the dance of affect and 
reasoning” (Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003), which in essence is a dual process 
proposal of risk and benefit judgment.  
Combining this research with evidence from bilingual studies, in Chapter 5 my 
colleagues and I investigated whether presenting hazards in a foreign language versus 
the native language influences risk and benefit perception. Recall that bilingual 
studies suggest that a foreign language is less emotional than the native language, and 
that the emotional gap is particularly pronounced for negative emotions (e.g., Wu & 
Thierry, 2012; Sheikh & Titone, 2015). This suggests that the affective pool of a 
stimulus would be more positive in a foreign than in the native language. Based on the 
affect heuristic, we predicted that presenting hazards in a foreign language, as 
opposed to the native language, would increase their perceived benefit and decrease 
their perceived risk. Crucially, we also predicted that this effect would be mediated by 
affect. Chapter 5 provides empirical evidence for these predictions. 
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Abstract 
We investigated whether and why the use of a foreign language influences moral 
judgment. We studied the trolley and footbridge dilemmas, which propose an action 
that involves killing one individual to save five. In line with prior work, the use of a 
foreign language increased the endorsement of such consequentialist actions for the 
footbridge dilemma, but not for the trolley dilemma. But contrary to recent theorizing, 
this effect was not driven by an attenuation of emotions. An attenuation of emotions 
was found in both dilemmas, and it did not mediate the foreign language effect on 
moral judgment. An examination of additional scenarios revealed that foreign 
language influenced moral judgment when the proposed action involved a social or 
moral norm violation. We propose that foreign language influences moral judgment 
by reducing access to normative knowledge.  
Keywords: moral judgment; foreign language; bilingualism; emotion; social 
and moral norms. 
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The foreign language effect on moral judgment: The role of emotions and norms 
The capacity to deliver moral judgments is a core aspect of social competence in 
humans. Philosophical and psychological investigations of moral cognition have often 
focused on complex dilemmas that create a tension between a deontological mode of 
responding, which stresses adherence to moral rules (e.g., “do not kill or harm innocent 
people”), and a consequentialist mode, which aims at maximizing the anticipated outcome 
(e.g., “do the greatest good for the greater number of individuals”). Research has shown that 
some moral scenarios tend to promote consequentialist judgments, while other scenarios, 
typically those that involve personal force and the instrumental use of a person [1, 2], tend to 
promote deontological judgments. For example, in the well-known trolley problems [3, 4], 
most people judge that it is acceptable to save five persons by hitting a switch that would 
produce one collateral victim (standard trolley problem), but deem it unacceptable to save 
five persons by pushing a person off a bridge (footbridge problem) [5, 6]. Why do people 
accept to save the lives of five by hitting a switch but not by pushing a person?1 
Two main kinds of explanations have been proposed. One emphasizes the causal 
structure of actions and their contexts and posits the effect of tacit knowledge of abstract 
moral principles [8–10]. The other perspective emphasizes the selective activation of 
different processing routes to moral judgment [2, 11, 12]. In this perspective, responses result 
either from one route that is characterized by automatic emotional processes or an alternative 
route that consists of controlled cognitive processes. Emotional, “heart” thinking prompts a 
deontological response, whereas deliberate, “head” thinking privileges a consequentialist 
response. Deontological responses will dominate when moral dilemmas trigger a strong 
emotional response (e.g., footbridge problem), whereas consequentialist responses will 
surface when dilemmas are low in emotional salience (e.g., trolley problem).  
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Consistent with this view, priming the emotional system has been shown to privilege 
deontological responses, whereas priming the analytic system has been shown to 
preferentially support consequentialist choices [13,14]. Furthermore, cognitive load has been 
shown to selectively interfere with consequentialist responses, suggesting that such answers 
are products of controlled cognitive processes [15]. Additional evidence for this dual-process 
model of morality comes from neuropsychological studies, which show that brain-damaged 
patients with emotional deficits are more likely to give consequentialist responses to highly 
emotional dilemmas than controls [16, 17, 18].  
Dual-process models of moral judgment may also guide research on language effects. 
In a recent study, Costa and colleagues reported that foreign language promotes 
consequentialist responses [19, 20]. These authors presented participants with the standard 
trolley and footbridge dilemmas either in a participants’ native language or in a foreign 
language. They recruited participants from several cultures and examined an impressive 
number of native—foreign language combinations. Foreign language systematically 
increased the rate of consequentialist responses for the footbridge dilemma but had no 
influence on the responses to the standard trolley dilemma. Following dual-process models of 
morality, these authors argued that foreign language influences moral choice by triggering 
cognitive and emotional distance, that is, by prompting cold, “head” thinking. Its effects are 
felt in the footbridge dilemma as this presumably triggers the “hot”, emotional system, but 
not in the trolley dilemma, which is presumably underpinned by the “cool”, controlled 
system. The authors supported their claim that foreign language attenuates emotions by 
referring to experimental evidence from bilingual studies [21, 22].  
Here we address whether and why presenting moral dilemmas in a foreign language 
rather than the native language influences moral judgment. By foreign language we mean a 
non-native language that has been learned in a classroom context, that is, outside the 
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environment where it is commonly used by native language speakers [23]. Our aim is 
twofold. First, we attempted to consolidate the findings of previous studies [19], which 
reported an increase of consequentialist responses in the footbridge dilemma, but not in the 
trolley dilemma. To this end, we presented these two dilemmas to native Italian speakers who 
learned either German or English as a foreign language (Study 1), and to native Chinese 
speakers who learned English as a foreign language (Study 2). Second, we aimed to 
investigate the claim that the foreign language effect on moral judgment is driven by reduced 
emotionality. For this purpose, alongside moral judgments we also gathered emotion ratings 
(Study 2). As a further test, we examined moral evaluations of additional high-emotion and 
low-emotion dilemmas (Study 3). If the effect is driven by reduced emotionality, then it 
should be more pronounced in the high-emotion dilemmas. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, we tested the foreign language effect on moral judgment using the 
footbridge and trolley dilemmas. We recruited students enrolled at foreign language courses 
at the University of Trento, because we wanted to ensure a good understanding of the 
materials. One group received the dilemmas in their native language, Italian, whereas two 
other groups in a foreign language, either English or German. We tested two foreign 
languages to assess the generality of the foreign language effect.  
Methods 
The study protocol was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Trento 
according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki. We obtained 
participants’ informed verbal consent by using a verbal consent protocol. The Ethics 
Committee of the University of Trento waived the requirement of written consent forms. 
Participants. One hundred five students (88 female, 17 male; Mage = 22.08 years, age 
range: 19–46 years) volunteered to participate at the beginning of foreign language classes in 
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German or English at the University of Trento.2 Thirty nine participants were randomly 
assigned to the native language condition (NL; Italian), 37 to the foreign language English 
condition (FLEnglish), and 29 to the foreign language German condition (FLGerman). All 
participants had an intermediate level certificate (B = independent user) in the respective 
foreign language as specified by the Common European Framework of Reference for 
Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment (CEFR; [25]). On average, participants in the 
FLEnglish condition had English education since the age of 10.72, CI [8.62, 13.31], and those 
in the FLGerman condition had German education since the age of 13.36, CI [11.74, 14.96]. 
Participants in the foreign language conditions were asked to self-assess their foreign 
language proficiency in terms of conversational fluency, reading, writing, and understanding 
on a 5-point scale (1 = almost none, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = very good; scale adapted 
from [26]). Across the four measures, the participants rated their foreign language skills as 
fair (FLEnglish: M = 3.33, CI [3.17, 3.50], FLGerman: M = 3.79, CI [3.64, 3.95]). 
Materials and Procedure. We presented participants with the trolley and the 
footbridge dilemmas, together with a non-moral filler dilemma (all items were adapted from 
[2]; see Appendix A for the full text). Each moral dilemma stated an action (i.e., hitting a 
switch, pushing a person off a bridge) that would harm an individual but as a consequence 
save five persons. Participants had to judge the appropriateness of the proposed action by 
selecting Yes (consequentialist response) or No (deontological response). The filler item 
concerned a choice between travelling by bus or train given certain time constraints, and was 
designed to induce a high rate of endorsements. We expected no language effect for this item. 
Its purpose was to assess whether participants in the foreign language condition understood 
the materials–misunderstandings should drive the endorsement rate towards 50%.  
The presentation order of the moral dilemmas was counterbalanced. In each condition, 
participants received a questionnaire entirely written in one language: Italian, English, or 
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German. In all our studies, the original materials were in English, and were translated to other 
languages by bilinguals. Two independent judges controlled the translated versions for 
consistency with the English version. The language versions were also closely matched for 
word count.  
Results 
 Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of presentation order. Hence, we dropped this 
factor from subsequent analyses. The main findings are illustrated in Figure 1. As anticipated, 
the use of a foreign language increased the rate of consequentialist responses in the 
footbridge dilemma but not in the trolley dilemma. While 12.8% of participants stated that it 
was appropriate to push the man off the footbridge when the dilemma was presented in the 
native language, this rate increased to 35.7% when it was presented in German, χ2 (1, N = 67) 
= 4.92, p = .027, φ = .27, to 43.2% when the dilemma was presented in English, χ2 (1, N = 
76) = 8.79, p = .003, φ = .34, and to 40% if we collapse over foreign language condition, χ2 
(1, N = 104) = 8.61, p = .003, φ = .29. In the trolley dilemma, 53.8% of participants chose to 
hit the switch when the dilemma was presented in the native language. Similar rates were 
observed when the language was German (60.7%), χ2 (1, N = 67) = 0.31, p = .576, φ = .07, 
and English (72%), χ2 (1, N = 76) = 2.99, p = .084, φ = .20, or the two pooled together 
(67.7%), χ2 (1, N = 104) = 1.99, p = .158, φ = .14. 
 In accord with previous research, within each language condition a higher proportion 
of participants endorsed the action of the trolley dilemma than of the footbridge dilemma (ps 
< .005, by binomial tests). Importantly, we observed no language differences for the non-
moral filler item: FLEnglish: 92.0% vs. NL: 87.2%, χ2 (1, N = 76) = .45, p = .50; FLGerman: 
93.1% vs. NL: 87.2%, χ2 (1, N = 68) = 0.63, p = .43, φ = 0.10; FLTotal: 92.4% vs. NL: 87.2%, 
χ
2
 (1, N = 105) = 0.78, p = .38, φ = 0.09. This suggests that the participants understood the 
materials.  
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Figure 1. Percentage of participants who endorsed the consequentialist action in Study 1, by 
dilemma type and language condition. The native language was Italian. The foreign language 
was either German (a) or English (b). *p < .05, **p < .01. 
  
Correlations between proficiency and moral judgment. We created a proficiency 
score by aggregating a participant’s self-ratings in reading and understanding (each scale 
ranged from 1 = almost none, to 5 = very good). We only considered these scales because 
they are the most pertinent for the current task. The highest possible score is 10, which we 
also assigned to the participants in the native language condition. In the footbridge dilemma, 
we found that the lower the language proficiency, the higher the rate of action endorsements: 
r(102) = –.22, p = .023. No correlation between proficiency and action endorsements were 
observed in the trolley dilemma, r(102) = –.09, p = .369, or the non-moral dilemma, r(102) = 
–.07, p = .505.  
Discussion 
In line with prior research [19, 20], Study 1 showed that foreign language increases 
the rate of consequentialist responses in the footbridge dilemma but not in the trolley 
dilemma. This effect was robust across two foreign languages, English and German. 
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Importantly, the use of a foreign language had no influence on the evaluation of a non-moral 
dilemma, which suggests that the effect is “real” and not due to misunderstanding.  
Study 2 
In Study 2, we aimed to generalize the foreign language effect to a sample of native 
Chinese speakers who learned English as a foreign language. Although China accounts for 
roughly one fifth of the world’s population, relatively few studies have examined how 
Chinese respond to moral dilemmas. Some cross cultural studies found cultural differences 
[27], whereas others did not [28]. Relevant to the present study, previous research has shown 
that the reduction of emotional force in a second language is also observed in late Chinese–
English bilinguals [29]. 
Methods 
Participants. We were granted access to courses in Tsinghua University, Wuhan 
University, and the Shanghai University of Sport, and tested 161 students (72 female, 88 
male,1 unknown, Mage = 23.41 years, age range: 18–40).3 Ninety-nine participants were 
randomly assigned to the foreign language condition (English), and 62 to the native language 
condition (Chinese). All participants reported to have a Band–4 College English Test 
certification (CET-4), which is the standard English as a foreign language test administered 
in China. In addition, participants had to self-assess their language proficiency in English in 
terms of conversational fluency, reading, writing, and understanding on a 5-point scale (1 = 
almost none, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = very good). Averaging across the four measures 
(Cronbach’s α = .86), participants judged their English skills as fair (M = 3.15, CI [3.01, 
3.29]). As a last task, participants assigned to the foreign language condition had to indicate 
whether they understood the scenarios on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = average, 7 = very 
well; this question was presented in Chinese). We excluded nine participants who rated their 
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understanding as 3 or less (their exclusion does not influence the main pattern of results). The 
data we report are from the remaining 152 participants.  
Materials and procedure. For the moral judgment task, we used similar materials 
and procedure as in Study 1. Participants were presented with the footbridge and trolley 
dilemmas, separated by a non-moral filler item. The presentation order of the moral dilemmas 
was counterbalanced. Following each dilemma, participants evaluated the moral 
permissibility of the proposed action on a binary scale (Yes/No), but here also on a more 
sensitive 7-point scale (1 = forbidden, 4 = permissible, 7 = obligatory; [5]). After the moral 
judgment questions, participants were asked to rate the extent to which each dilemma made 
them feel distressed (Thinking about the scenario I just read, I felt… upset, worried, and sad). 
For each emotion, participants had to respond using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = 
somewhat, 7 = very much; adapted from [30]). 
Results 
  Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of presentation order. Therefore, we dropped 
this factor from subsequent analyses.  
Moral judgment (Yes/No). The main findings are illustrated in Figure 2. There was a 
significant foreign language effect for the footbridge dilemma (FL: 22.2% vs. NL: 9.7%), χ2 
(1, N = 152) = 4.07, p = .044, φ = .16, but not for the trolley dilemma (FL: 56.7% vs. NL: 
56.5%), χ2 (1, N = 152) < 1, p = .979, φ < .01. In line with Study 1 and previous research, 
within each language condition, a higher proportion of participants endorsed the action of the 
trolley versus the footbridge dilemma (ps < .001, by binomial tests). No language effect was 
present for the non-moral item (FL: 94.4% vs. NL: 93.5%), χ2 (1, N = 152) < 1, p = .818, φ = 
.02.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of participants who endorsed the consequentialist action in Study 2, by 
moral dilemma and language condition (native language = Chinese, foreign language = 
English). *p < .05. 
 
Moral judgment (7-point scale). The main findings are illustrated in Figure 3. We 
submitted the permissibility ratings to a 2 (Language: foreign vs. native) × 3 (Dilemma type: 
footbridge vs. trolley vs. non-moral) mixed-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
repeated measures on dilemma type. This ANOVA revealed a main effect of language 
condition, F(1, 149) = 16.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. As anticipated, mean consequentialist 
ratings were higher in the foreign language condition (MFL = 3.93, CI [3.71, 4.14]) than in the 
native language condition (MNL = 3.23, CI [2.97, 3.49]). Importantly, this main effect was 
qualified by a significant language × dilemma interaction, F(1.92, 286.45) = 5.93, p = .003, 
ηp
2 
= .04.4 The language effect was present only in the footbridge dilemma (MFL = 2.84, CI 
[2.46, 3.22] vs. MNL= 1.44, CI [1.21, 1.74]), t(143) = 6.09, p < .001, d = 0.95, Cl [0.95, 1.86]. 
There was also a main effect of dilemma type, F(1.92, 286.45) = 125.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .46. 
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In line with previous research, mean consequentialist ratings were lower in the footbridge 
dilemma (M = 2.14, CI [1.89, 2.39]) than in the trolley dilemma (M = 3.61, CI [3.31, 3.91]). 
(For the non-moral dilemma: M = 4.99, CI [4.75, 5.23]). 
Figure 3. Mean consequentialist ratings in Study 2 (1 = the action is forbidden, 4 = the action 
is permissible, 7 = the action is obligatory) by moral dilemma and language condition (native 
language = Chinese, foreign language = English). Error bars indicate the standard error of the 
mean. *p < .05. 
 
 Correlations between proficiency and moral judgments. As in Study 1, we created 
a proficiency score by aggregating a participant’s self-ratings in reading and understanding. 
We computed correlations between language proficiency and action endorsements (Yes = 1, 
No = 0) and between language proficiency and action permissibility ratings (1–7). For the 
footbridge dilemma, we found that the lower the language proficiency the higher the action 
endorsements, r(150) = –.21, p = .009, as well as the higher the permissibility ratings, r(149) 
= –.48, p < .001. For the trolley dilemma, there was no correlation between proficiency and 
action endorsements, r(150) = –.02, p = .810, or permissibility ratings, r(149) = –.14, p = 
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.099. For the non-moral dilemma, there was also no correlation between proficiency and 
action endorsements, r(150) = .09, p = .288, or permissibility ratings, r(149) = –.11, p = .170. 
Distress ratings. The three distress scales (upset, worried, and sad) were highly 
correlated (Cronbach’s α was .80 for the trolley dilemma, and .81 for the footbridge 
dilemma). Therefore, we collapsed them into a single distress index by calculating the mean 
over the three scales. With respect to the native language, the foreign language attenuated 
distress ratings for both moral dilemmas. A 2 (Language: foreign vs. native) × 2 (Dilemma 
type: trolley vs. footbridge) mixed-factor ANOVA, revealed a significant main effect of 
language, F(1, 150) = 5.04, p = .026, ηp2 = .03, which was not qualified by an interaction, 
F(1, 150) = 0.04, p = .846, ηp2 < .01. Overall, distress ratings were lower in the foreign 
language condition (MFL = 4.88, 95% CI [4.60, 5.16]) than in the native language condition 
(MNL= 5.38, CI [5.04, 5.72]). Distress ratings were higher in the trolley dilemma (M = 5.30, 
CI [5.06, 5.54]) than in the footbridge dilemma (M = 4.96, CI [4.70, 5.23]), as revealed by a 
significant main effect of dilemma type, F(1, 150) = 8.19, p = .005, ηp2 = .05.5 
Mediation analysis. We also conducted a mediation analysis to examine whether 
emotion mediates the effect of language on moral judgment in the footbridge dilemma. (We 
did not conduct a similar analysis for the trolley dilemma, as no language effect was detected 
for this item.) We used the SOBEL macro for SPSS [34] and the non-parametric 
bootstrapping procedure (5,000 bootstrapped re–samples). The predictor was language 
(foreign vs. native) and the mediator distress ratings. The total and indirect effects of 
language on moral judgment were respectively, 1.41 (p < .001) and 1.40 (p < .001). An 
examination of the total indirect effect of language on moral judgment through distress 
indicated no mediation, since its 95% BCa bootstrap CI contains zero, –0.085 to 0.109.  
Discussion 
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 Study 2 successfully extended the foreign language effect on moral judgment to late 
Chinese–English bilinguals. It also investigated whether this effect is underpinned by an 
attenuation of emotions, as it was proposed, but not tested, in previous studies. The use of a 
foreign language attenuated emotions in both moral dilemmas, and the emotion attenuation 
did not mediate the association between language and moral judgment. 
Study 3 
Following Greene’s original proposal [2], one could conjecture that the foreign 
language effect on moral judgment is found in personal dilemmas, such as the footbridge 
scenario, but not in impersonal dilemmas, such as the trolley scenario. The two types of 
dilemmas vary on a number of dimensions, any one of which could be critical for observing 
the effect. For example, personal dilemmas involve harm caused using personal force, and the 
instrumental use of a person [1]. The main aim of Study 3 was to investigate whether the 
foreign language effect is linked to the personal-impersonal distinction. To this end, we 
examined an additional personal dilemma (high-emotion), the so-called 'crying baby scenario', 
and an additional impersonal dilemma (low-emotion), the 'lost wallet scenario' (for an 
assessment of these dilemmas in terms of emotionality, see [16]). The evidence that the 
crying baby dilemma is highly emotional, even more than the footbridge or the trolley 
dilemmas, is widely supported [31]. A further aim was to replicate the findings of Studies 1 
and 2 as well as of previous studies showing a foreign language effect in the footbridge 
dilemma and no effect in the trolley dilemma. To test the robustness of the foreign language 
effect, we examined yet a different sample of bilinguals: native German speakers who learned 
English as a foreign language.    
Method  
Participants. Seventy-two native German speakers participated in this study (55 
female, 15 male, 1 unknown; mean age = 26.63 years, age range = 18–70 years).6 Thirty-eight 
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participated at the beginning of a lecture at the Free University of Berlin, while 34 in an 
online version of the study. The online-study participants were recruited from the University 
Osnabrück and Humboldt University Berlin via email lists. The link to the online survey was 
active for one week. Within the class and online parts of the study, participants were 
randomly assigned either to the foreign language condition (n = 38; English) or to the native 
language condition (n = 34; German). The level of qualification in English of the participants 
assigned to the foreign language condition ranged from beginner (A = basic user) to 
advanced (C = proficient user), with the majority holding an intermediate level qualification 
(B = independent user) (based on the CEFR; [25]). On average, the participants assigned to 
the foreign language condition began English education at age 9.02, CI [8.45, 9.60]. These 
participants were also asked to rate their proficiency in English in terms of conversational 
fluency, reading, writing, and understanding, on a 5-point scale (1 = almost none, 2 = poor, 3 
= fair, 4 = good, 5 = very good). Averaging across the four measures 
(Cronbach’s α = .89), they rated their skills as good (M = 4.05,CI [3.80, 4.26]). 
Materials and procedure. Participants were presented with the trolley, footbridge, 
and non-moral dilemma of Studies 1 and 2 along with an extra dilemma of each type (all 
dilemmas were adapted from [2]; for the full text see Appendix). The new dilemmas included 
a personal dilemma (crying baby), an impersonal dilemma (lost wallet), and a non-moral 
scenario. In the crying baby dilemma one must decide whether to smother one’s own child in 
order to save oneself and several others from being found and killed by enemy soldiers. In the 
lost wallet dilemma a person in need must decide whether to return a wallet full of cash that 
seems to belong to a wealthy individual. In the new non-moral dilemma one must decide 
whether to make two trips home by car rather than a single trip to carry some plants in order 
to avoid ruining the car’s upholstery. About half of the participants in each language 
condition received the six dilemmas in a randomized order, while the other half received 
Chapter 2: Foreign Language and Trolley Dilemmas 
 
 
40 
 
them in the inverse order. Following each dilemma, participants had to rate the permissibility 
of the described action on a 7-point scale (1 = forbidden, 4 = permissible, 7 = obligatory; 
[5]).  
Results 
Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of method of administration (in classroom vs. 
online), or presentation order. Hence, we dropped these factors from subsequent analyses. In 
contrast to Studies 1 and 2, preliminary analyses revealed a significant gender effect. In line 
with prior work [13], male participants rated the consequentialist actions as more permissible 
(M = 3.00, CI [2.60, 3.40]) than female participants (M = 2.44, CI [2.23, 2.65]), F(1, 68) = 
6.24, p = .015, ηp2 = .08. Given that gender differences were not a focus of the present study, 
in the analyses below we included gender as a covariate.  
Moral judgments. The main findings for the moral items are illustrated in Figure 4. 
Notice that the pattern of the means for the four dilemmas is consistent with that reported in 
prior research [2]. We conducted a 2 (Language: foreign vs. native) × 4 (Moral dilemmas: 1–
4) mixed-factor analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with gender as a covariate. There was a 
main effect of language, F(1, 68) = 6.29, p = .015, ηp2 = .09. Mean consequentialist ratings 
were higher in the foreign language condition (MFL = 2.74, CI [2.51, 2.97])7 than in the native 
language condition (MNL = 2.32, CI [2.08, 2.57]). This effect was not qualified by a language 
× dilemma interaction, F(2.63, 178.89) = 0.29, p = .811, ηp2 < .01.8 There was no main effect 
of dilemma, F(2.63, 178.89) = 2.58, p = .063, ηp2 = .04.  
A similar analyses performed for the non-moral scenarios showed no significant 
differences between the foreign language condition (M = 4.87, CI [4.60, 5.13]) and the native 
language condition (M = 4.50, CI [4.22, 4.78]), F(1, 70) = 3.60, p = .062, f = .22. There was a 
main effect of scenario, F(1, 70) = 79.85, p < .001, f = 1.07, but no Language × Scenario 
interaction, F(1, 70) = 0.55, p = .461, f = .09.    
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In order to examine whether the foreign language effect is present in the footbridge 
dilemma and absent in the trolley dilemma, we conducted planned comparisons using 
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVAs) with gender as a covariate. Confirming 
the pattern found in the previous studies, we detected a significant foreign language effect in 
the footbridge dilemma (MFL = 2.04, CI [1.73, 2.36], MNL = 1.53, CI [1.20, 1.87]), F(1, 68) = 
4.79, p = .032, ηp2 = .07, but not in the trolley dilemma (MFL = 3.87, CI [3.45, 4.29], MNL = 
3.67, CI [3.21, 4.12]), F(1, 68) = 0.42, p = .517, ηp2 = .01. We also performed similar 
analyses for the new dilemmas. A significant foreign language effect was observed in the lost 
wallet dilemma (MFL = 2.42, CI [2.08, 2.76], MNL = 1.90, CI [1.54, 2.27]), F(1, 68) = 4.29, p 
= .042, ηp2 = .06, but not in the crying-baby dilemma (MFL = 2.63, CI [2.15, 3.11], MNL = 
2.18, CI [1.67, 2.70]), F(1, 68) = 1.60, p = .211, ηp2 = .02. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean consequentialist ratings (1 = forbidden, 4 = permissible, 7 = obligatory) by 
dilemma type and language condition in Study 3 (native language = German; foreign 
language = English). Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. *p < .05. 
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Correlations between proficiency and moral judgment. Preliminary analyses 
showed that the participants in the foreign language condition reported high self-ratings of 
proficiency in reading and understanding (M = 8.61, CI [8.12, 9.08]). As a result, there was 
little variation in proficiency and thus weak associations between proficiency and moral 
judgment. The only dilemma for which we observed a significant (negative) correlation was 
the lost wallet: the lower the language proficiency, the higher the consequentialist ratings, 
r(70) = –.30, p = .011.  
Discussion 
In Study 3 we examined whether the foreign language effect is linked to the personal-
impersonal distinction. The results do not support this hypothesis. We observed a foreign 
language effect, but this effect was not qualified by an interaction with dilemma type. 
Replicating the findings of Studies 1 and 2, detailed analyses showed that foreign language 
influenced moral judgments in the footbridge (personal) but not in the trolley (impersonal) 
dilemmas. Critically, the effect was also present in an impersonal dilemma (lost wallet). A 
surprising finding was that the foreign language effect was absent in the crying baby 
dilemma. This could be because, in contrast to the other dilemmas, in this dilemma the victim 
of the action would die regardless. In economic jargon, performing the action is the dominant 
option, because its payoff is better than the payoff of omitting the action. Participants in both 
language conditions might have thought about the dominance relation, which would explain 
both the high permissibility ratings (which are consistent with previous research; see Greene 
et al., 2001) and the absence of the foreign language effect.9  
Meta-analyses 
In Studies 1 and 3 there was a trend of a foreign language effect in the trolley 
dilemma. We examined this possibility by performing a random effects meta-analysis 
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summarizing the three studies. For completion, we also performed a similar meta-analysis for 
the footbridge dilemma. 
 Trolley dilemma. Figure 5 illustrates the results of a random effects meta-analysis 
summarizing the three studies regarding the moral choices and judgments in the trolley 
dilemma (we used Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals, see Cummings, 2012). The 
main result of each study (foreign language effect) is represented as a square marking the 
effect size (Cohen’s d), and its 95% CI. The diamond represents the overall effect size of the 
meta-analysis, and its 95% CI. The overall effect size was 0.11, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.29], which 
is interpreted as no effect (Cohen, 1988). In conclusion, there was no foreign language effect 
for the trolley dilemma across the three studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Forest plot indicating the effect sizes (squares) and 95% CIs (lines) of the three 
studies for the foreign language effect on the trolley dilemma. The diamond illustrates the 
overall effect size and its 95% CI given by a random effects meta-analysis (MA) that 
combines the three studies. 
-0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Cohen's d
Study 1–choices, d = 0.28, CI [-0.12, 0.68], N = 102 
 
Study 2–choices, d = 0.01, CI [-0.32, 0.33], N = 150 
 
Study 2–ratings, d = 0.14, CI [-0.18, 0.47], N = 149 
 
Study 3–ratings, d = 0.04, CI [-0.43, 0.50], N = 70 
 
 
 
MA combination, d = 0.11, CI [-0.07, 0.29] 
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Footbridge dilemma. Figure 6 illustrates the results of a random effects meta-
analysis summarizing the three studies regarding the moral choices and judgments for the 
footbridge dilemma between the foreign language and the native language conditions. The 
overall effect size was 0.52, 95% CI [0.34, 0.71], which is interpreted as intermediate effect 
(Cohen, 1988). In conclusion, there was an intermediate foreign language effect for the 
footbridge dilemma across the three studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Forest plot indicating the effect sizes (squares) and 95% CIs (lines) of the three 
studies for the foreign language effect on the footbridge dilemma. The diamond illustrates the 
overall effect size and its 95% CI given by a random effects meta-analysis (MA) that 
combines the three studies.  
General Discussion 
 The present studies provide strong evidence that the use of a foreign language 
influences the moral evaluation of complex moral dilemmas. In line with previous work [19, 
20], foreign language increased the rate of consequentialist responses in the footbridge 
dilemma but not in the trolley dilemma (Studies 1–3, meta-analyses). However, in contrast to 
-0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
Cohen's d
Study 1–choices, d = 0.60, CI [0.19, 1.01], N = 104 
 
Study 2–choices, d = 0.33, CI [0.01, 0.66], N = 152 
 
Study 2–ratings, d = 0.68, CI [0.35, 1.02], N = 151 
 
Study 3–ratings, d = 0.50, CI [0.03, 0.98], N =  71 
 
 
 
MA combination, d = 0.52, CI [0.34, 0.71] 
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previous theorizing, the results do not support the claim that this effect is driven by reduced 
emotionality. Foreign language attenuated emotions in response to both the footbridge and 
trolley dilemmas, and this emotion attenuation did not mediate the effect of foreign language 
on moral judgment (Study 2). Furthermore, the foreign language effect was not constrained to 
personal dilemmas; it was also present in an impersonal dilemma (lost wallet; Study 3). 
Interestingly, the foreign language effect was absent in the crying baby dilemma, which we 
suggested might be due to that this dilemma had a distinctive feature that was absent in all  
other moral dilemmas: the negative outcome of the action (the baby’s death) would occur 
anyway, even if the action were not performed.9  
If the emotional attenuation is not a viable explanation for the foreign language effect 
on moral judgment then what drives this effect? Why was the effect absent from the trolley 
dilemma but present in the footbridge and lost wallet dilemmas? Perhaps the critical 
difference is that the trolley dilemma does not involve a “taboo” or prohibited action. Social 
and moral rules prohibit us from pushing people or keeping lost wallets. However, we have 
no general rules prohibiting flipping switches (see Cushman’s dual-system framework of 
morality [35]). We propose that foreign language may influence moral judgment by reducing 
the mental accessibility of social and moral rules. For this explanation to work, one has to 
assume that in the case of flipping the switch the categorization of the action at a more 
abstract level (killing the collateral innocent victim) is less automatic than the categorization 
of the other actions, such as keeping the wallet as a prototypical form of stealing.  
Evidence that foreign language reduces the accessibility of social and moral rules 
comes from a study showing that foreign language promotes less condemnation of violations 
of everyday social and moral norms, such as cutting in line when in a hurry, or cheating in an 
exam [36]. Further evidence comes from a study in which participants were asked to translate 
swearwords either from a native to a foreign language or vice versa [37]. In the native to 
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foreign language translations, participants used “stronger” words to translate politically 
incorrect swearwords which were directed against social groups, compared to other types of 
swearwords. The authors of this study argued that in a foreign language the social and 
cultural norms are less salient, which makes it easier for people to use inappropriate 
swearwords (for similar views see [29, 38]).  
One way through which foreign language might reduce the activation of social and 
moral norms, is by limiting access to relevant autobiographical memories. Research suggests 
that memories are language specific, and therefore are more accessible when the language 
used at retrieval matches the one present at encoding [39–41], that is, the native language. 
Research suggests that several moral and social rules are learned through social 
communication [42], and that a great chunk of such rules concern prohibitions of specific 
actions [43]. An analysis of a large corpus of data demonstrated that 99% of child-directed 
speech about rules of conduct, referred to the prohibition of particular actions, such as “Don’t 
throw paper on the floor!”, but there were also many cases of parents just saying “No!” [43]. 
A foreign language might evoke memories related to such prohibitions to a lesser extent than 
the native language. Consistent with this claim, Harris and colleagues [44, 21] showed that 
the use of a foreign language reduced electrodermal activity in response to childhood 
reprimands (“Don’t do that!”).  
One limitation of the present research is that we employed a restricted number of 
moral dilemmas. Future research should examine a wider variety of moral scenarios [45, 46, 
28]. A second limitation is that some of the scenarios we used (e.g., footbridge, trolley) are 
arguably “exotic” and distant from real life [47, 48]. Notice, however, that the foreign 
language effect extended to the more mundane lost wallet scenario. It would be worth 
investigating whether the effect generalizes to other realistic situations [see 36] and actual 
behavior. A third limitation is that we measured emotional reactions by means of rating 
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scales after the moral judgment was made. It could be that the higher emotion ratings in the 
trolley dilemma, as compared to the footbridge dilemma, are related to post-decisional 
processes. But note that previous studies have also measured emotions before the moral 
judgment was made and they failed to find support for the claim that the footbridge dilemma 
evokes more negative emotion than the trolley dilemma [31; see also 32]. A fourth limitation 
is that the increase in consequentialist responses found in the foreign language condition 
might be because participants assigned to that condition might have assumed that the 
situations involved foreign people in a foreign country. Research suggests that feelings of 
social connection to the characters involved in a dilemma influences moral evaluations [49, 
50, 52]. But notice that the effect was present also in a study where participants were 
explicitly instructed to assume that the characters were co-nationals and that the situation 
took place in their country [36]. 
The present findings have important societal implications. International decisions 
such as those taken by the Economic European Community and the United Nations often 
involve communication in a foreign language (mostly in English). A number of such 
decisions involve a tradeoff between causing intentional harm to a number of individuals in 
the near future (e.g., by imposing strict economic rules), to increase the prosperity of a 
greater number of individuals in a relatively more distant future. If the use of foreign 
language reduces access to knowledge of social norms and deontological moral principles , 
then international decisions may be swayed (for better or worse) towards a consequentialist 
choice. 
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Footnotes 
1
 We follow Greene [7] in using deontological and consequentialist to mean 
“characteristically deontological” and “characteristically consequentialist” as a function of 
response content, not the underlying motivation. 
2
 Sample size was determined by conducting an a–priori sample size calculation using 
G*power [24] for a 2 × 2 χ2 test. The parameters were set as follows: effect size w = 0.4 
(medium-high, estimated), alpha level = .05, power = .8, and degrees of freedom = 1. The 
calculation indicated a minimum sample size of 50. No interim analyses or stopping rules 
were applied. 
3 In Study 2, we used a binary (Yes/No) measure and a more sensitive 7-point scale 
(see Materials and Procedure). To determine the appropriate sample size, we conducted two 
a–priori sample size calculations using G*power [24]. The first was for a 2 × 2 χ2 test, with 
the same settings as in Study 1. The calculations revealed a minimum sample size of 50. The 
second was for a 2 × 3 mixed ANOVA. The parameters were set as follows: effect size f = 
0.3 (medium-high), alpha level = .05, power = .8, correlation among measures at .4. The 
calculation indicated a minimum sample size of 56. No interim analysis or stopping rules 
were applied. 
4
 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2 (2, N 
= 151) = 6.09, p = .048, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .96).  
5 Although one might expect that the footbridge dilemma evokes stronger emotional 
reactions than the trolley dilemma [16], several studies have failed to find such evidence [31–
33]. 
6 The total sample size was determined in the same way as in Study 2. The a–priori 
sample size calculation indicated a minimum sample size of 56. Initially, we planned to 
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conduct the entire study at the end of a class session at the Department of Psychology of the 
Free University Berlin. Forty–eight participants volunteered to participate, but 10 participants 
were excluded from the analyses as they were not native German speakers. Therefore, we 
decided to increase the sample size by conducting an online version of the study. No interim 
analyses or stopping rules were applied. 
7 Two data points were detected as outliers as their values were greater than three 
standard deviations from the means. We winsorized these two values by aggregating the 
mean and two standard deviations. 
8 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2 (5, N 
= 71) = 16.53, p = .005, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .88).  
9 We wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing to us this explanation.   
10 Please note that we do not wish to claim that foreign language does not influence 
affect, Study 2 demonstrated that it does [23]. Furthermore, studies in the domain of risk and 
benefit perception have shown a foreign language effect that is mediated by affect [51]. 
Rather, the claim is that the foreign language effect on moral dilemmas might be more 
complex.  
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Appendix  
Dilemmas used in Studies 1, 2, and 3 (English versions). 
Personal dilemmas 
Footbridge. A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five 
workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a 
footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. 
Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be very large. The only 
way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and 
onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die 
if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. Is it appropriate for you to push the 
stranger on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen? [This dilemma was used 
in all studies] 
Crying Baby. Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have 
orders to kill all remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have 
sought refuge in the cellar of a large house. Outside you hear the voices of 
soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables. Your baby begins to 
cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand 
from his mouth his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill 
you, your child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the 
others you must smother your child to death. Is it appropriate for you to smother 
the child in order to save yourself and the other townspeople? [This dilemma was 
used in Study 3] 
Impersonal dilemmas 
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Trolley. You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork 
in the tracks. On the tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. 
On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway workman. If you do nothing 
the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of the five workmen. The only 
way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your dashboard that 
will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the single workman. 
Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to save the lives of the five 
workmen? [This dilemma was used in all studies] 
Lost Wallet. You are walking down the street when you come across a wallet 
lying on the ground. You open the wallet and find that it contains several hundred 
euros in cash as well the owner's driver's license. From the credit cards and other 
items in the wallet it's very clear that the wallet's owner is wealthy. You, on the other 
hand, have been hit by hard times recently and could really use some extra money. 
You consider sending the wallet back to the owner without the cash, keeping the cash 
for yourself. Is it appropriate for you to keep the money you found in the wallet in 
order to have more money for yourself? [This dilemma was used in Study 3] 
Non-moral dilemmas 
Train or Bus. You need to travel from Bologna [Beijing; Berlin] to Ancona 
[Jinan; Leipzig] in order to attend a meeting that starts at 2:00 PM. You can take 
either the train or the bus. The train will get you there just in time for your meeting no 
matter what. The bus is scheduled to arrive an hour before your meeting, but the bus 
is occasionally several hours late because of traffic. It would be nice to have an extra 
hour before the meeting, but you cannot afford to be late. Is it appropriate for you to 
take the train instead of the bus in order to ensure you are not being late for your 
meeting? [This dilemma was used in all studies]  
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Plant Transport. You are bringing home a number of plants from a store 
that is about 5 kilometers from your home. The trunk of your car, which you've 
lined with plastic to catch the mud from the plants, will hold most of the plants 
you've purchased. Is it appropriate for you to make two trips home in order to avoid 
ruining the upholstery of your car? [This dilemma was used in Study 3] 
Chapter 3: Foreign Language and Moral Transgressions 
 
 
59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
How foreign language shapes moral judgment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the following original article: 
 
Geipel, J., Hadjichristidis, C., & Surian, L. (2015). How foreign language shapes 
moral judgment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 59, 8–17. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2015.02.001 
 
Please note: The following article may not exactly replicate the final version 
published in the journal. It is not the copy of record
Chapter 3: Foreign language and Moral Transgressions 
 
60 
 
Abstract 
We investigated whether and how processing information in a foreign language as opposed to 
the native language affects moral judgments. Participants judged the moral wrongness of 
several private actions, such as consensual incest, that were depicted as harmless and 
presented in either the native or a foreign language. The use of a foreign language promoted 
less severe moral judgments and less confidence in them. Harmful and harmless social norm 
violations, such as saying a white lie to get a reduced fare, were also judged more leniently. 
The results do not support explanations based on facilitated deliberation, misunderstanding, 
or the adoption of a universalistic stance. We propose that the influence of foreign language 
is best explained by a reduced activation of social and moral norms when making moral 
judgments. 
 Keywords: moral judgment, foreign language, bilingualism, emotion, social and 
cultural norms 
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How foreign language shapes moral judgment 
Imagine reading about the case of a brother and sister who have an incestuous 
relationship. What would your moral reaction be? Most people judge incest as wrong, even in 
circumstances where potential harm is minimized (Haidt, 2001). Now imagine reading the 
same story in a foreign language that you comprehend well. Would your moral reaction 
change? It shouldn’t – the story is the same (principle of description invariance [Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981] or extensionality [Arrow, 1982]).1 But psychological research on moral 
violations suggests that it might: A higher proportion of participants judge that it is 
acceptable to shove a man into the path of a trolley to save five lives, when the scenario and 
questions are printed in a foreign language rather than in their native language (Cipolletti, 
McFarlane & Weissglass, 2015; Costa et al., 2014; Geipel, Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2014).  
Here we aimed to extend the foreign language effect to actions that are relatively 
harmless, but nevertheless typically condemned. We expected that foreign language would 
distance participants from intuition and gut-feelings, and through that promote less harsh 
moral judgments. We considered two competing hypotheses. Costa et al. (2014) proposed 
that a “muted” intuition could make the moral machinery switch from the default automatic, 
intuitive mode, to a controlled mode, thus focusing the attention to the harmless 
consequences (see also Cipolletti et al., 2015). We call this the controlled-processing 
hypothesis. Alternatively, the moral machinery might remain on the automatic, intuitive 
mode, but the muted intuition would nevertheless promote less harsh moral judgments. We 
call this the automatic-processing hypothesis. This could happen either through an 
attenuation of the typical aversive reaction (see the affect heuristic; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, 
& MacGregor, 2002; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), or a reduction of the mental 
accessibility of moral and social rules (e.g., Bond & Lai, 1986; Dewaele, 2010). Moral and 
Chapter 3: Foreign language and Moral Transgressions 
 
62 
 
social rules are learned and experienced through interactions involving the native language, 
and so a foreign language might evoke them to a lesser extent (see Marian & Neisser, 2000). 
Prior research 
 Foreign language has been shown to attenuate emotional response to words and 
phrases (for reviews see Caldwell-Harris, 2014; Pavlenko, 2012). For example, Harris and 
colleagues found that childhood reprimands, such as “Don't do that!”, evoked reduced skin 
conductance responses when they were read aloud in a foreign language (Harris, Ayçiçegi, & 
Gleason, 2003; Harris, Gleason, & Ayçiçeği, 2006). Moreover, a large questionnaire-based 
study has shown that late bilinguals rated taboo words and swearwords as less emotional in a 
foreign language than in a native language (Dewaele, 2004; Pavlenko, 2004). Studies also 
suggest that a foreign language facilitates people to discuss topics that are considered off-
limits or taboo in their native language. For example, Bond and Lai (1986) found that 
Chinese-English bilinguals spoke longer about embarrassing topics, such as sexual attitudes, 
in a foreign language. In the same vein, Dewaele (2010) found that several UK-based 
multilinguals preferred using swearwords in a foreign language, stating that a foreign 
language allows them to escape from social and cultural restrictions. However, some studies 
have failed to detect an attenuation of emotions (e.g., Ayçiçegi-Dinn, & Caldwell-Harris, 
2009; Eilola, Havelka, & Sharma, 2007; Sutton, Altarriba, Gianico, & Basnight-Brown, 
2007). To reconcile these findings, Harris and colleagues proposed that the relative 
emotionality of a foreign versus a native language depends on a complex interplay between 
age of acquisition, level of proficiency, and the emotional context in which the foreign 
language is learned and used (Caldwell-Harris, 2014; Harris et al., 2006). 
Foreign language has also been shown to reduce decision biases that are believed to 
have an emotional basis (Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 2012). Moreover, recent studies 
demonstrated that it also influences moral judgment (Costa et al., 2014; Geipel et al. 2014). 
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This research was confined to trolley dilemmas (Foot 1978; Thompson, 1985) that create 
tension between a characteristically utilitarian perspective, which aims at maximizing net 
benefit, and a characteristically deontological perspective, which forbids actions that harm 
innocent others. You are informed that a runaway trolley will kill five people unless an action 
is performed, either pulling a lever (standard trolley dilemma) that would make the trolley 
switch to alternative tracks where one workman is standing, or by pushing a person off a 
bridge (footbridge dilemma). Is it morally acceptable to perform such actions? Adults and 
children by the age of four typically respond that it is acceptable to pull the lever, but not to 
push the person (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Pellizzoni, Siegal, & Surian, 2010).  
The dual-process theory of moral judgment (e.g., Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) explains 
these findings by suggesting that responses result from a competition between an automatic, 
emotional system that prompts a deontological response, and a slow, controlled system that 
favors a utilitarian response.2 When the proposed action is emotionally salient (pushing a 
person off a bridge), the emotional system predominates; when it is not (pulling a lever), the 
controlled system overrides the emotional system and produces a characteristically utilitarian 
response (see also Koenigs et al., 2007). 
When these trolley dilemmas were presented in a foreign language, utilitarian 
responses increased but just for the footbridge dilemma (Costa et al., 2014; Geipel et al., 
2014). Furthermore, as proficiency in the foreign language increased, language differences 
decreased. These results were robust across a variety of foreign—native language 
combinations and cultures (for a replication, see Cipolletti et al., 2015). The proposed 
explanation is that foreign language triggers emotional distance, which privileges controlled 
processing (controlled-processing hypothesis). Its effects are observed in the footbridge 
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dilemma, as this is typically processed by the emotional system, but not in the trolley 
dilemma, which is commonly processed by the controlled system (Greene et al., 2001).  
Notice that these findings are also compatible with the automatic-processing 
hypothesis. The footbridge dilemma involves a prohibited action (pushing a person; see 
Cushman, 2013), whereas the trolley dilemma does not. It could be that foreign language 
promoted utilitarian responses for the footbridge dilemma, because it allowed people to see 
past the taboo action (either by reducing the aversive response linked to the prohibition, 
and/or by deactivating social and moral norms). This interpretation is consistent with recent 
research that shows that characteristically utilitarian responses do not necessarily imply 
controlled processes, but may also arise from impaired social cognition, such as reduced 
empathy (see Duke & Bègue, 2015; Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015). 
Previous studies examining the role of foreign language on moral judgment have four 
limitations. First, they have examined only the trolley dilemmas, which involve severe 
personal harm and concern contrived cases distant from the participants’ experience (Hare, 
1981; Sunstein, 2005). Second, these dilemmas involve a numerical tradeoff (killing one in 
order to save five). As processing information in a foreign language is difficult, people might 
have treated the dilemmas as simple math problems (Bloom, 2011). Third, these studies offer 
no empirical support for the central claim that language has a cooling effect on emotions, or 
that this cooling effect prompts controlled (utilitarian) reasoning. Fourth, the results are open 
to an in-group out-group interpretation (Caldwell-Harris, 2014). Participants reading the 
materials in a foreign language might have inferred that the scenarios concerned foreign 
people (out-group), whereas those reading them in the native language might have inferred 
that they concerned co-nationals (in-group). Research suggests that feeling socially connected 
to the characters portrayed in a scenario influences moral judgment (e.g., Bloom, 2011; 
Greene, 2013; Lucas & Livingston, 2014). Thus, the observed foreign language effect might 
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reflect added assumptions, rather than the use of foreign language per se. In the present study 
we address all these issues.  
Present research 
Our first aim was to broaden the scope of the foreign language effect on moral 
judgment. We examined different types of violations that, according to the categorization 
proposed by Shweder, Much, Mahapatra and Park (1997; see also Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 
2010), concern the ethics of Community (e.g., violations of loyalty), Autonomy (e.g., 
violations of fairness) and Divinity (e.g., violations of purity) (CAD for short; for an 
extension of this model see Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2008). We 
selected violations that did not involve physical harm, such as siblings having consensual and 
safe sex (see e.g., Björklund, Haidt, & Murphy, 2000; Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008; 
adapted from Haidt, 2001). People typically judge such behaviors as ethically wrong, but 
struggle to supply moral justifications (moral dumbfounding; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). 
To test the generalizability of this effect, we also asked participants to evaluate relatively 
harmful and harmless social norm violations in community and autonomy ethics. We 
predicted that foreign language would promote less harsh moral judgments. 
Our second aim was to test whether the effect of foreign language on moral judgment 
is underpinned by an attenuation of emotions, as previous studies have suggested. A third aim 
was to differentiate between the automatic- and controlled-processing hypotheses. To this 
purpose, we used two tasks. We asked participants to state their confidence in their moral 
evaluations, and to answer a tricky question (see Study 3), which tests the ability to override 
an intuitive wrong answer. Finally, we assessed a number of deflationary explanations of the 
foreign language effect, such as that it is simply due to misunderstanding, or in-group out-
group considerations. 
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Study 1 
In Study 1, we examined whether reading moral transgressions in a foreign versus a 
native language influences moral wrongness judgments (see Table 1 for descriptions of the 
scenarios). We tested native German speakers and native Italian speakers. For both, the 
foreign language was English. We predicted that the use of a foreign language would 
promote less harsh moral judgments.  
Methods  
Participants. 
Study 1a. Forty-eight students (34 female, 14 male; mean age = 27.27 years, range: 
18–70 years) from the Free University of Berlin participated at the beginning of a class.3 
Twenty-seven students were randomly assigned to the foreign language condition and 
received a questionnaire in English and 21 to the native language condition and received its 
German equivalent. Ten participants were excluded from the analyses, as they were not 
native German speakers. For all studies, details of the participants assigned to the foreign 
language conditions are presented in Appendix A. 
Study 1b. Sixty-four students (56 female, 6 male, 2 unknown; mean age = 20.56 
years, range: 19–24 years) from the University of Trento participated at the beginning of an 
English class for credits.4 Thirty-six were randomly assigned to the foreign language 
condition (English), and 28 to the native language condition (Italian). Four participants were 
excluded from the analyses, as they were not native Italian speakers. 
Materials and Procedure. We used four scenarios (adapted from Haidt et al., 1983; 
Eyal et al., 2008) each describing one or more persons committing a moral violation (see 
Table 1, dog, incest, exam and flag items). Participants were asked to judge the wrongness of 
each action on a scale ranging from 0 (perfectly ok) to 9 (extremely wrong). Two presentation 
orders were created and counterbalanced across participants. In all our studies the original  
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Table 1 
Scenarios Used in Studies 1, 2 and 3 (English Versions). 
Note. Superscripts indicate the studies in which the scenarios were used. 
 
materials were in English, they were translated by individuals who are highly proficient in the 
foreign and native languages used, and checked by bilingual speakers for comparability. The 
two versions of each scenario were also closely matched for word counts. 
 
Scenario Description 
Moral   
Dog1, 2, 3  Frank’s dog was killed by a car in front of his house. Frank had 
heard that in China people occasionally eat dog meat, and he was curious 
what it tasted like. So he cut up the body and cooked it and ate it for dinner. 
[Study 1a: Franz; Study 1b: Frank; Study 2: Franco; Study 3: Lorenzo] 
Incest1, 2, 3 A brother and sister are alone in the house and decide to make love 
just once. The sister is already taking birth control pills and the brother uses 
a condom. They both enjoy the act but decide not to do it again. They 
promise each other to keep it a secret.  
Exam1, 2, 3 A student who doesn’t know the answers to some of the questions in 
an exam copies them from a student sitting in front of him. He doesn’t get 
caught and he and the other student both get good grades. [Study 3: Silvia] 
Flag1, 2 A woman is cleaning out her closet, and she finds a national flag. 
She decides to cut it up into small pieces and uses the pieces to clean the 
toilet. 
Bonus 3 Two employees have worked equally toward a project. The project 
went well so they are entitled to a collective bonus of 1000 Euros. The 
manager, Giulia, is a friend of one of the employees and wants to allocate 
the entire bonus to him. Giulia sends an email to the finance office, but the 
email never arrives due to a server failure. As a result, each employee gets 
500 Euros. 
Non-moral  
Train3  Francesca lives in Florence and would like to visit one of her friends 
in Imola. If she takes the Eurostar she has to pay 21 Euro but the service is 
very comfortable. If she instead takes the regional train she pays 6 Euro but 
the wagons are a bit cold and dirty. Francesca takes the regional train. 
Brand3 Marco has a strong headache. He goes to the pharmacy with the 
intention of buying a headache medicine from Bayer. The pharmacy is out 
of the medicine from Bayer Marco was looking for, but has a generic 
product which is, in his words, "exactly the same" as the product he 
intended to buy. Marco buys the generic brand medicine. 
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Results 
Study 1a. The results are illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1. We submitted the 
mean wrongness ratings to a 2 (Language: foreign vs. native) × 4 (Scenario: 1-4) mixed 
factor analysis of variance (ANOVA), with repeated measures on scenario. As predicted, 
there was a significant main effect of language, F(1, 34) = 6.44, p = .016, f = .43. The 
scenarios were judged less harshly in the foreign language (M = 3.57, CI [2.83, 4.31])5 than 
in the native language (M = 4.91, CI [4.13, 5.70]). There was also a significant main effect of 
scenario, F(3, 102) = 24.52, p < .001, f = .85. Mean wrongness ratings for the dog scenario 
(M = 6.14, CI [5.21, 7.07]) and the incest scenario (M = 5.53, CI [4.57, 6.49]) were 
significantly higher than those for the exam scenario (M = 3.42, CI [2.40, 4.44]) and the flag 
scenario (M = 1.72, CI [0.95, 2.50]). There was no language × scenario interaction, F(3, 102) 
= 1.34, p = .265, f = .20. 
Study 1b. The results are illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1. We submitted the 
mean wrongness ratings to a 2 (Language: foreign vs. native) × 4 (Scenario: 1-4) mixed-
factor ANOVA, with repeated measures on scenario. As in Study 1a, we found a significant 
main effect of language, F(1, 58) = 4.93, p = .030, f = .29. The scenarios were judged less 
harshly when presented in the foreign language (M = 5.40, CI [4.73, 6.07]) than in the native 
language (M = 6.55, CI [5.76, 7.34]). There was a significant main effect of scenario, F(3, 
174) = 15.57, p < .001, f = .52. The mean wrongness ratings of the incest scenario (M = 6.93, 
CI [6.23, 7.64]), the dog scenario (M = 6.20, CI [5.38, 7.02]), and the exam scenario (M = 
6.40, CI [5.77, 7.03]) were all significantly higher than the mean wrongness rating of the flag 
scenario (M = 4.36, CI [3.67, 5.05]). No other differences were observed. There was no 
language × scenario interaction, F(3, 174) = 0.54, p = .656, f = .10.  
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Figure 1. Mean wrongness of action ratings (0 = perfectly ok; 9 = extremely wrong) by 
scenario and language condition. In Study 1a (a) the native language was German and the 
foreign language was English. In Study 1b (b) the native language was Italian and the foreign 
language was English. Error bars represent 95% CIs.  
 
Study 2 
In Study 2, we presented a new sample of late Italian-English bilinguals with the same 
four scenarios. In addition to moral judgments, we also asked participants to rate their 
emotional reactions. Here, our main aim was to examine whether foreign language influences 
moral judgments by attenuating emotions. 
Methods 
Participants. Seventy-eight English majors (61 female, 15 male, 2 unknown; mean 
age = 23.11 years, age range: 20–38 years) from the University of Verona participated at the 
beginning of an English lesson; 42 were randomly assigned to the foreign language condition 
(English), and 36 to the native language condition (Italian).6 
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Materials and Procedure. Following each scenario, participants judged the 
wrongness of the action that was depicted in it. They were also asked to rate how upset, 
worried, disgusted, sad, and angry they felt while reading the scenario using a 5-point scale 
(1 = very slightly or not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4 = quite a bit, 5 = extremely; from 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The presentation order of the moral judgment and emotion 
rating tasks was counterbalanced. Preliminary analyses revealed no order effects and so we 
dropped this factor from the analyses.  
Results and discussion 
Emotion ratings. The five emotion scales were highly associated (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .85 in the native language condition, Cronbach’s alpha = .85 in the foreign language 
condition). Thus, we reduced the five scales into an emotion index score by taking their 
average (see Figure 2). The resulting scores were submitted to a 2 (Language: foreign vs. 
native) × 4 (Scenario: 1-4) mixed-factor ANOVA, with repeated measures on scenario. 
Although there was no main effect of language, F(1, 76) = 1.24, p = .268, f = .13, there was a 
significant language × scenario interaction, F(3, 228) = 5.56, p = .001, f = .26. Simple one-
way ANOVAs revealed that foreign language attenuated emotions in the dog scenario (MFL = 
3.33, MNL = 3.88), F(1, 76) = 6.30, p = .014, f = .29, and in the incest scenario (MFL = 2.84, 
MNL = 3.48), F(1, 76) = 7.22, p = .009, f = .31, but not in the exam scenario (MFL = 2.26, MNL 
= 2.05), F(1, 76) < 1, p = .341, f = .11, and flag scenario (MFL = 2.45, MNL = 2.12), F(1, 76) = 
1.62, p = .207, f = .15. There was also a main effect of scenario, F(3, 228) = 42.89, p < .001, f 
= .75. Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean emotion ratings of the dog scenario (M = 
3.61, CI [3.39, 3.83]), the incest scenario (M = 3.16, CI [2.92, 3.40]) and the flag scenario (M 
= 2.28, CI [2.03, 2.54]) were significantly higher than the mean emotion rating of the exam 
scenario (M = 2.16, CI [1.93, 2.38]). 
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Figure 2. Mean emotion ratings by scenario and language condition (Study 2). Native 
language: Italian; Foreign language: English. Error bars indicate 95% CIs. *p < .05,**p < .01. 
 
Moral judgments. Previous studies have suggested that foreign language influences 
moral judgment by attenuating emotions. We thus grouped the items into those that showed 
an attenuation of emotions (dog, incest) and those that did not (exam, flag). We predicted that 
foreign language would promote less harsh moral judgments but for only the dog and incest 
items. Furthermore, these items were relatively more emotional than the exam and flag items, 
and previous research suggests that the effect of foreign language is confined to high emotion 
items, such as the footbridge dilemma (Costa et al., 2014; Geipel et al., 2014).  
The findings are illustrated in Figure 3 and are consistent with this prediction. We 
analyzed the mean wrongness ratings with simple one-way ANOVAs. For the dog and incest 
items foreign language promoted less harsh moral judgments (M = 7.75, CI [7.22, 8.27]) than 
the native language (M = 8.47, CI [8.15, 8.79]), F(1, 76) = 5.17, p = .026, f = .23. For the 
exam and flag items, foreign language (M = 5.59, CI [4.88, 6.15]) and native language (M = 
5.68, CI [5.08, 6.33]) induced similar moral ratings, F(1, 76) = 0.04, p = .851, f < .01.  
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Figure 3. Moral wrongness ratings for the groups of items by language condition (Study 2). 
Higher scores indicate higher moral wrongness ratings. Native language: Italian; Foreign 
language: English. Error bars represent 95% CIs. **p < .01. 
 
Correlations between emotion and moral judgment ratings. If foreign language 
promotes dispassionate controlled thinking, then moral judgments should rely less on 
emotions and gut feelings. Therefore the correlation between moral judgments and emotion 
ratings should be weaker in the foreign language condition than in the native language 
condition (see Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Contrary to this prediction, both correlations were 
statistically significant (native language: r[36] = .70, p < .001; foreign language: r[41] = .56, 
p < .001), and did not differ from one another (z = 1.01, p = .311).  
Mediation analyses. We performed a mediation analysis using the SOBEL macro by 
Preacher and Hayes (2004). We used only the dog and incest items, for which we detected an 
attenuation of emotions. We used the bootstrapping procedure (5000 bootstrapped re-
samples). Figure 4 illustrates the results. There was a significant direct effect of language on 
moral judgment (B = -.72, SE = .32, p = .026). The indirect effect controlling for emotions 
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lies between -1.020 and -0.085 with 99% confidence (B = -.46, SE = .19). Because this 
interval does not include 0, we can conclude that emotion mediates the association between 
language and moral judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Illustration of the direct effect (a) and indirect effect (b) of language on moral 
judgment (Study 2). Numbers refer to unstandardized beta weights. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p 
< .005. 
As a check of the proposed mediation hypothesis, we also conducted an analysis 
based on a reverse mediation model. We assessed whether the association between language 
and emotions is mediated by moral judgments. There was a direct effect of language on 
emotions (B = -.55, SE = .18, p = .003). The indirect effect of language on emotions 
controlled for moral judgment lies between -0.460 and 0.009 with 99% confidence (B = -19, 
SE = .09). Since this interval includes 0, we can conclude that there is no reverse mediation. 
Taken together, the analyses suggest that, for the dog and incest items, emotions mediated the 
effect of language on moral judgment. 
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In sum, in Study 2 we found that the use of a foreign language promotes less harsh 
moral judgments but only for the dog and incest items. For these items, foreign language 
influenced moral judgment through an attenuation of emotions. Moreover, in both language 
conditions moral judgments and emotion ratings were significantly correlated and to a similar 
extent, which is consistent with the automatic-processing hypothesis. 
Study 3 
In Study 3 we further examined whether foreign language influences moral judgment 
through an attenuation of emotions. Study 2 found support for this hypothesis but only in two 
out of four items. Interestingly, these items concerned violations of purity, whereas the other 
items concerned a violation of fairness (exam) and loyalty (flag). Could it be that the effect of 
foreign language on moral judgment is mostly confined to purity violations? Studies 1a and 
1b, as well as previous studies on Trolley dilemmas (Costa et al., 2014; Geipel et al., 2014), 
suggest that this is not the case, but Study 2 leaves open this possibility. In Study 3 we 
addressed this question by testing two violations of purity (dog, incest) and two violations of 
fairness (exam, bonus; see Table 1). As a further test of the generalizability of the foreign 
language effect, we also asked participants to rate the moral wrongness of 15 items 
containing relatively harmful (e.g., Sell someone a defective car) and harmless (e.g., Fail to 
vote in minor elections) social norm violations in community and autonomy ethics (see 
Appendix B).  
A second aim of Study 3 was to provide evidence to distinguish between the two 
competing hypotheses. To this end, we used two new tasks: the Moses illusion task and the 
confidence-rating task. In the Moses illusion task (Song & Schwarz, 2008; see Appendix B 
for full instructions) participants are asked: “How many animals of each kind did Moses take 
on to the ark?” The correct answer is “can’t say” (since the biblical character was Noah), but 
most people are unable to override the automatic response “two” (Alter, 2013). If foreign 
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language promotes deliberation, then it should improve performance. The automatic-
processing hypothesis predicts no such improvement. If anything, the increased burden on 
cognitive resources might deteriorate performance.  
In the confidence-rating task, participants rated how sure they were in their moral 
evaluations. The automatic-processing hypothesis predicts that when using a foreign 
language people would be less confident in their judgments because they might lack the “it 
feels wrong!” signal that accompanies a strong aversive reaction,7 which could be grounded 
on emotions and/or sociocultural norms. In contrast, if the use of a foreign language promotes 
deliberative thinking, the controlled-processing hypothesis predicts that people would be 
more confident, as their judgment will be a product of careful analysis (for further evidence 
that deliberative thinking leads to higher confidence, see Mata, Ferreira, & Sherman, 2013).  
In Study 3 we also controlled for the possibility that the foreign language effect is due 
to misunderstanding (we asked participants to translate the materials). Furthermore we 
assessed whether it is constrained to the use of English, the modern lingua franca, as a 
foreign language (here we used German). Participants were told explicitly that the scenarios 
took place in their native country and involved co-nationals, in order to rule out possible in-
group out-group factors. To assess whether foreign language promotes a universalistic stance, 
we asked participants to rate how close they feel to People in my community, Italians, and 
People around the world.8  
Methods 
Participants. Seventy-four German major students (67 females, 7 males; mean age = 
21.03 years, age range: 18–30 years) from the University of Trento participated at the 
beginning of a German lesson.9 Participants were randomly assigned to either the foreign 
language condition (German; n = 37) or the native language condition (Italian; n = 37). 
Analyses of the translations revealed that two participants assigned in the foreign language 
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condition mistranslated one item each. The scores for these two items were excluded from the 
analyses. 
Materials and Procedure. We used two purity violations (dog, incest), two fairness 
violations (exam, bonus), and two non-moral scenarios (brand, train; see Table 1), both of 
which should be judged as “perfectly ok.” Following a scenario, participants received either 
the moral judgment task or the emotion-rating task (in counterbalanced order). We used the 
same scales as in Study 2. Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of order, so we dropped 
this factor from the analyses. Following the moral judgment task, participants were asked 
“How sure are you in your evaluation?” and were given a scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
sure) to 7 (very sure). Next, participants received the Moses illusion task (see Appendix B), 
and then a subscale of the Identification with All Humanity Scale (McFarland, Webb, & 
Brown, 2012). Participants were asked: “How close do you feel to each of the following 
groups?”: People in my community, Italians, People around the world and were given a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all close) to 5 (very close). Finally, participants evaluated 15 violations 
of everyday moral and social norms on a scale ranging from 1 (not wrong) to 4 (severely 
wrong) (see Appendix B). 
Results and discussion 
Emotion ratings. As in Study 2, the five emotion scales were highly associated 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .92 in the native language condition, Cronbach’s alpha = .85 in the 
foreign language condition). We thus computed an emotion index by taking the mean score 
over the five scales. These mean emotion scores were submitted to a 2 (Language: foreign vs. 
native) × 4 (Scenario: 1-4) mixed-factor ANOVA, with repeated measures on scenario. There 
was no main effect of language, F(1, 69) = 0.46, p = .501, f = .08, but a marginally significant 
language × scenario interaction, F(3, 207) = 2.32, p = .077, f = .18. Simple one-way 
ANOVAs revealed that foreign language attenuated emotions for only the dog item (MFL = 
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3.70, CI [3.37, 4.03], MNL = 3.13, CI [2.73, 3.53], F(1, 72) = 4.98, p = .029, f = .26. As in the 
previous studies, there was a significant main effect of scenario, F(3, 207) = 29.79, p < .001, f 
= .66. Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean emotion rating of the dog scenario (M = 
3.42, CI [3.16, 3.68]) was significantly higher than the mean ratings of the bonus (M = 2.91, 
CI [2.64, 3.18]) and exam scenarios (M = 2.06, CI [1.83, 2.29]). The mean emotion rating of 
the incest scenario (M = 3.14, CI [2.88, 3.39]) was significantly higher than the mean 
emotion rating of the exam scenario.  
We next tested whether proficiency in a foreign language is associated with emotion 
ratings. We created a proficiency score by aggregating a participant’s self-ratings in reading 
and understanding (both scales ranged from 1 = almost none, to 5 = very good). The highest 
possible score is 10, which we also assigned to the participants in the native language 
condition. We found no significant association between proficiency and mean emotion 
ratings, r(72) = .12, p = .322.  
Moral judgments. If the influence of foreign language on moral judgments is 
mediated by an attenuation of emotion, then we should observe no language effect on moral 
judgment, or perhaps an effect for only the dog item. The results of a 2 (Language: foreign 
vs. native) × 4 (Scenario: 1-4) mixed-factor ANOVA do not support this prediction (see 
Figure 5). There was a significant main effect of language condition, F(1, 68) = 8.28, p = 
.005, f = .35, which was not qualified by a language × scenario interaction, F(3, 204) = 0.67, 
p = .573, f = .10. The scenarios were judged less harshly in the foreign language (M = 6.77, 
CI [6.33, 7.21]) than in the native language (M = 7.65, CI [7.23, 8.07]). There was also a 
significant main effect of scenario, F(3, 204) = 30.51, p < .001, f = .66. The incest item 
received the highest mean moral wrongness rating (M = 8.15, CI [7.75, 8.56]), followed by 
the bonus item (M = 7.92, CI [7.45, 8.39]), the dog item (M = 7.47, CI [6.97, 7.97]), and the 
exam item (M = 5.30, CI [4.67, 5.93]). Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean 
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wrongness ratings of the dog item, the incest item and the bonus item were all significantly 
higher than the mean wrongness rating of the exam item.  
 
Figure 5. Moral wrongness ratings by scenario and language condition (Study 3). Native 
language: Italian; Foreign language: German. Higher scores indicate higher moral wrongness 
ratings. Error bars represent 95% CIs.  
 
We also computed a correlation between proficiency in a foreign language and moral 
judgment ratings. We found that the higher the language proficiency, the harsher the moral 
judgment: r(72) = .25, p = .034.  
Correlations between emotion and moral judgment ratings. As in Study 2, within 
each language condition we computed a correlation between moral judgments and (negative) 
emotion ratings. Both correlations were statistically significant (native language: r[35] = .49, 
p = .002; foreign language: r[35] = .41, p = .012), and not different from one another (z = -
0.39, p = .699). In both languages, higher negative emotion ratings were associated with more 
severe moral wrongness judgments.  
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Confidence ratings. The automatic-processing hypothesis predicts that foreign 
language would decrease confidence in one’s moral evaluations, whereas the controlled-
processing hypothesis suggests the opposite. The results from a 2 (Language: foreign vs. 
native) × 4 (Scenario: 1-4) mixed-factor ANOVA support the automatic-processing 
hypothesis (see Figure 6). There was a significant main effect of language, F(1, 68) = 9.61, p 
= .003, f = .38, which was not qualified by a language × scenario interaction, F(3, 204) = 
2.35, p = .074, f = .18. Participants in the foreign language condition were less confident in 
their moral judgments (M = 6.07, CI [5.81, 6.33]) than participants in the native language 
condition (M = 6.63, CI [6.38, 6.88]).  
 
Figure 6. Confidence ratings in one’s moral evaluations by scenario and language conditions 
(Study 3). Native language: Italian; Foreign language: German. Higher scores indicate higher 
confidence ratings. Bars represent 95% CIs.  
 
There was also a significant main effect of scenario, F(3, 204) = 4.41, p = .005, f = .25. The 
incest item received the highest mean confidence rating (M = 6.65, CI [6.42, 6.88]), followed 
by the bonus item (M = 6.46, CI [6.21, 6.71]), the dog item (M = 6.18, CI [5.90, 6.47]), and 
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the exam item (M = 6.10, CI [5.78, 6.43]). Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean 
confidence rating of the incest item was significantly higher than the mean confidence ratings 
of the dog and exam items.  
We then computed a correlation between proficiency in a foreign language and 
confidence ratings. It was significant and positive: r(72) = .42, p < .001; the higher the 
language proficiency, the higher the participants’ confidence in their moral judgments. 
Moses illusion task. If foreign language promotes analytic reasoning, as the 
controlled-processing hypothesis claims, then it should increase the frequency of correct 
responses in this task. It did not. In the native language condition 35.1% of participants 
responded correctly (“can’t say”), compared to 16.2% in the foreign language condition, χ2(1, 
N = 74) = 3.47, p = .062, φ = -.22. For the control item, no differences were observed 
between the two language conditions, χ2(1, N = 74) = 2.38, p = .123, φ = -.24.  
Identification with All Humanity Scale. If foreign language promotes a 
universalistic stance, then we should observe differences in terms of how much participants 
identify with close and distant social groups. We analyzed the data using a 2 (Language: 
foreign vs. native) × 3 (Social group: people in my community vs. Italians vs. people around 
the world) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor. There was no main effect of 
language: Participants in the foreign language condition gave similar closeness ratings (M = 
3.56, CI [3.33, 3.78]) as participants in the native language condition (M = 3.69, CI [3.47, 
3.92]), F(1, 71) = 0.75, p = .389, f = .10. Also, there was no main effect of social group, F(2, 
142) = 1.05, p = .353, f = .12, and no language × social group interaction, F(2, 142) = 0.90, p 
= .409, f = .11.  
Everyday moral and social norms. Here we addressed whether the foreign language 
effect generalizes to the evaluation of norm violations that concern relatively harmless and 
harmful actions in community and autonomy ethics. To the extent that it does, foreign 
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language should promote less harsh moral judgments. We tested this hypothesis by 
conducting two analyses of variance, one treating subjects as a random factor (F1), the other 
items (F2). In accord with the automatic-processing hypothesis, participants in the foreign 
language condition gave less harsh moral judgments (M = 2.67, CI [2.54, 2.80]) than 
participants in the native language condition (M = 2.94, CI [2.83, 3.05]), F1(1, 73) = 10.17, p 
= .002, f = .45. This result was robust in the analysis by items, F2(1, 14) = 11.76, p = .004. In 
13 (out of 15) items, the means were in the expected direction (the exact binomial probability 
of getting 13 or more hits out of 15 trials is .007, two-tailed). We also computed a correlation 
between moral judgments and proficiency. It was significant and positive: r(72) = .36, p = 
.001; the higher the language proficiency, the harsher the moral judgment. 
General Discussion 
The use of a foreign language, as opposed to a native language, elicited less harsh 
moral judgments for actions that violate purity, fairness, and loyalty norms, but have 
relatively harmless consequences. This was true across three native-foreign language 
combinations: German-English, Italian-English, and Italian-German. The use of a foreign 
language also elicited less harsh moral judgments for fifteen violations of everyday social and 
moral norms in community and autonomy ethics. Thus, the present findings consolidate and 
extend previous ones regarding the trolley dilemmas (Costa et al., 2014; Geipel et al., 2014). 
Critically, in contrast to previous studies, the present findings are not open to explanations 
based on misunderstanding, added assumptions concerning who is involved in the scenarios 
(e.g., in-group or out-group members), a generic bias that distorts the use of the rating scale 
(the effect was present in scenarios that induce both low and high levels of acceptance, and 
was absent from non-moral scenarios), or people reducing a moral judgment to a simple math 
problem.  
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The present studies provide limited support for the claim that the effect of foreign 
language is mediated by an attenuation of emotions. Such an effect was found only for two 
out of four violations in Study 2. In Study 3 we found a main effect of foreign language on 
moral judgments, but no attenuation of emotions. The failure to detect a widespread 
attenuation of emotions could be related to how we measured them. Research suggests that 
emotional scales with verbal anchors (e.g., 1 = not at all disgusted to 5 = extremely 
disgusted) elicit higher ratings when the anchors are in a foreign language than in a native 
language (the anchor contraction effect; see de Langhe, Puntoni, Fernandez, van Osselaer, 
2011). Presumably emotional anchors are felt less strongly in a foreign language, and thus 
participants compensate by selecting more extreme ratings. Another potential issue is that 
some emotion words might lack direct translation equivalents in a foreign language 
(Pavlenko, 2008). Future research could overcome these issues by eliciting emotions through 
emotional scales labeled in the native language, scales that are supplemented by nonverbal 
cues such as emoticons or colors (see de Langhe et al., 2011, Studies 8 & 9), or by using 
more direct measures of emotions such as facial affect. 
The present findings are not consistent with the idea that foreign language promotes a 
switch from intuitive to controlled processes (see Keysar et al., 2012; Costa et al., 2014), but 
rather suggest that intuitive processes remain active (see also Hadjichristidis, Geipel, & 
Savadori, in press). First, foreign language promoted less confidence in one’s moral 
evaluations. This finding suggests that foreign language makes people judge in accord to 
weakened or confused intuitions rather than enlightened utilitarian reasoning. An enlightened 
utilitarian should consider carefully all outcomes and so be confident in his or her decision. 
Standard economic theory cannot explain certain doubts in a rational agent (see Shafir, 
Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). Rational agents compute the (expected) utility associated with 
each option, and choose the one with the highest value (see also Mata et al., 2013). However, 
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an individual who relies on weak intuitions should be much less confident. The reduction in 
gut feelings that makes this person less radical in his or her moral positions, also explains the 
reduced confidence in those positions.  
Second, foreign language did not improve performance on the Moses illusion task. 
Costa and colleagues (Costa et al., 2013, Study 4) have similarly failed to find improved 
performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), a logical task where 
correct responding necessitates the inhibition of an intuitive answer that is incorrect. These 
authors suggest that the foreign language effect might be confined to problems that have an 
emotional component. An independent reason to doubt the controlled-processing hypothesis 
is that thinking in a foreign language should increase cognitive load, and thus hinder rather 
than facilitate analytical and deliberative reasoning (see Keysar et al., 2012).  
One reason why foreign language might promote less harsh moral judgments can be 
traced to memory and socio-cultural learning processes. The language in which an event is 
encoded facilitates its recall (e.g., Marian & Neisser, 2000; Schrauf & Rubin, 2000, 2004). 
All the moral violations we studied concerned norms that have been learned directly or 
indirectly through social interactions involving the native language. Therefore, a native 
language is more likely to activate these social and moral norms than a foreign language. In 
support of this, Gawinkowska and colleagues (Gawinkowska, Paradowski, & Bilewicz, 2013) 
demonstrated that bilinguals use stronger words to translate swearwords from a native-to-a-
foreign language than vice versa, especially for politically incorrect swearwords, such as ones 
directed at social groups (ethnophaulisms). These authors argue that a foreign language 
exempts bilinguals from self- or socially-imposed norms, thus making them more prone to 
offending others (see also Bond & Lai, 1986; Dewaele, 2010).  
This account helps explaining the present findings: all five moral transgressions as 
well as the fifteen violations of everyday moral and social norms involved behaviors which 
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have been learned and experienced predominantly in contexts in which the native language 
was used. It can also explain the findings with the trolley dilemmas. The foreign language 
effect was present in the footbridge dilemma but absent in the trolley dilemma, because only 
the footbridge dilemma involves a prohibited action (pushing a person; see also Cushman, 
2013). Similarly, the effect was absent from the non-moral dilemmas, because these 
dilemmas did not involve social norms. 
A further possibility is that the use of a foreign language might prompt a generic 
feeling of uncertainty, which in turn promotes less extreme moral judgments. Here we cannot 
address this hypothesis as the confidence ratings were tied to the moral evaluations. But 
future studies could examine whether foreign language also reduces confidence in one’s 
responses concerning emotion-neutral items, such as general knowledge questions.  
Conclusion 
 The present research extends the foreign language effect to harmless-but-offensive 
actions, but also to relatively harmful and harmless violations of everyday social norms. 
Foreign language promoted less harsh moral judgments and less confidence in one’s moral 
evaluations. The present findings do not support the view that the use of a foreign language 
turns people into enlightened rationalists, reasoning coldly in terms of utilitarian principles. 
Rather, the picture that emerges is of people who are guided by a muted intuition, perhaps 
due to reduced activation of relevant moral and cultural norms. Whatever the final verdict 
might be in the theoretical arena, studying how foreign language influences moral judgment 
is of applied interest, as international public policy involves communicating and processing 
materials in a foreign language before taking decisions that impact on the populations of 
many countries.  
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Footnotes 
1 The principle of description invariance or extensionality holds that the way options are 
described should not influence a person’s preferences about them. 
2 We follow Greene (2014) in using deontological and utilitarian to mean respectively 
"characteristically deontological" and "characteristically utilitarian" as a function of the response 
content, not the underlying motivation. 
 
3 The sample size was determined based on an a-priori power analysis using G*power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) with the following settings: statistical power = .80, effect size f 
= .35 (medium to large effect size, based on Geipel et al., 2014), p = .05, number of groups = 2 
(language conditions), number of repeated measures = 4 (scenarios), correlation between repeated 
measures ρ = 0.3 (estimated). The analysis indicated a minimum sample size of 34. We tested more 
participants than the power analysis suggested because the present studies were conducted during 
classes in which a greater number of participants was available (this applies to all reported studies). 
In the present studies, no interim analyses or stopping rules were applied. 
4 To determine the appropriate sample size we conducted an a-priori power analysis utilizing 
the estimates from Study 1a: effect size f = .43, alpha level = .05, power = .8, and ρ = 0.4. The 
minimum sample size suitable to detect a main effect of language condition was 26.5 We report 
95% CIs unless otherwise stated. 
6 The sample size was determined via an a-priori power analysis using the estimates from 
Study 1b: effect size f = .29, alpha level = .05, power = .8, and ρ = 0.6. The indicated minimum 
sample size was 68. 
7 We thank Catherine Caldwell-Harris for suggesting this possibility to us. 
8 We thank the action editor, Roger Giner-Sorolla, and an anonymous reviewer for 
suggesting several of these alternative explanations. 
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9 The appropriate sample size was calculated based on an a-priori sample size calculation 
using the estimates from Study 1b: effect size f = .29 (medium effect), alpha level = .05, power = .8, 
and ρ = 0.6. The analysis indicated a minimum sample size of 68. 
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Appendix A 
Details of Participants in the Foreign Language Conditions. 
Table A.1  
Details of participants in the foreign language conditions. 
Note. aParticipants evaluated their language skills in terms of conversational fluency, reading, 
writing, and understanding, each on a 5-point scale (1 = almost none, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 
= very good; scale adapted from Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-Dinn, 2009). Here we report the mean 
rating across these scales. bAll participants had at least an intermediate level certificate (B1 or B2) 
in the foreign language as specified by the Common European Framework of Reference for 
Languages (CEFR; see page 24 in: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/Source/Framework_EN.pdf 
for descriptors). cWe asked participants to rate how well they understood each scenario on a 6-point 
scale ranging from 50% (some understanding) to 100% (excellent understanding). dParticipants 
evaluated their language skills in terms of reading and understanding, each on a 5-point scale (1 = 
almost none, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = very good). We report the mean rating across these 
scales.  
 Means, 95% CI   
Study 1a (n = 19)  
Start age of  
English education  
 
  8.82, [8.13, 9.54] 
Self-ratings of  
language skills in Englisha 
 
  3.82, [3.46, 4.14] 
Study 1b (n = 35)b  
Start age of  
English education  
 
  9.29, [8.64, 9.91] 
Self-ratings of  
language skills in Englisha 
 
  3.64, [3.45, 3.78] 
Self-ratings of  
comprehension of the materialsc 
 
  97%, [96%, 99%] 
Study 2 (n = 42)b  
Start age of  
English education  
 
  8.40, [7.76, 8.98] 
Self-ratings of  
language skills in Englisha 
 
  3.99, [3.87, 4.17] 
Study 3 (n = 37)b    
Start age of  
German education  
 
11.78, [10.42, 13.22] 
Self-ratings of  
language skills in Germand 
 
  3.72, [3.40, 4.00] 
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Appendix B 
English Versions of the Moses Illusion and Everyday Social and Moral Norms Tasks 
(Study 3) 
Moses illusion task 
 This task was developed by Erickson and Mattson (1981) (see also Reder & 
Kusbit, 1991, and Song & Schwarz, 2008). Following Song and Schwarz (2008), 
participants were instructed:  
“You will read a couple of trivia questions and answer them. You can write 
the answer in the blank. In case you do not know the answer, please write 
'don't know.' You may or may not encounter ill-formed questions which do not 
have correct answers if taken literally. For instance, you might see the question 
'Garfield is the dog of which cartoon?' In fact, Garfield is not a dog it is a cat. 
Please, write 'can't say' for this type of question.” 
Following these instructions, participants had to respond to two questions: 
(A) “Which country is famous for cuckoo clocks, chocolate, banks, and pocket 
knives?” (control question; correct answer: Switzerland) 
 
(B) “How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?”  
(Moses illusion; correct answer: can’t say) 
Everyday social and moral norms  
These materials were taken from Khemiri, Guterstam, Franck, and Jayaram-
Lindström (2012), who selected them from Mendez, Anderson, and Shapira (2005). 
Participants were given to evaluate 15 items, each on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
wrong) to 4 (severely wrong). 
In your opinion, how wrong is it to… 
1) Fail to keep minor promises 
2) Take the last seat on a crowded bus 
3) Sell someone a defective car 
4) Drive after having one drink 
5) Cut in line when in a hurry 
6) Don’t give blood during blood drives 
7) Are mean to someone you don’t like 
8) Say a white lie to get a reduced fare 
                                                   Chapter 3: Foreign language and Moral Transgressions 
 
 
97 
 
9) Drive out the homeless from your neighborhood 
10) Not help someone pick up their dropped papers 
11) Keep excess-change at a store 
12) Not offer to help after an accident 
13) Ignore a hungry stranger 
14) Fail to vote in minor elections 
15) Keep money found on the ground 
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Testing three explanations for the foreign language effect on 
moral judgment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the following original article: 
 
Geipel, J., Hadjichristidis, C., & Surian, L. (2015). Testing three explanations for the 
foreign language effect on moral judgment. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
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Abstract 
Research has shown that the use of a foreign language affects moral judgment, but 
little is known about the underlying processes. Here, we assessed three hypotheses: 
(1) foreign language triggers controlled processing, focusing attention on the final 
outcomes; (2) foreign language induces an abstract mindset, focusing attention on 
agents’ motives; (3) moral judgment remains intuition-based, but aversive signals 
related to norm violations become attenuated, promoting more positive moral 
judgments. We found that a foreign language induced less harsh moral evaluations of 
offensive actions attenuated by positive contextual circumstances and more positive 
evaluations of helping actions attenuated by negative contextual circumstances. 
Contrary to the predictions derived from the first and second hypotheses, participants’ 
choices as well as justifications reveal that foreign language did not shift attention to 
end outcomes, and did not influence mindset. The findings instead provide support for 
the third, intuition-based account. 
 Keywords: foreign language, moral judgment, construal level, intention 
Chapter 4: Explanations of the Foreign Language Effect  
 
 
100 
 
Testing three explanations for the foreign language effect on  
moral judgment 
As a result of globalization, citizens and policymakers often judge and decide 
based on information communicated in a foreign language, mostly English (see 
Crystal, 2003). By a foreign language we mean a non-native language that has been 
learned in a classroom context rather than by immersion in a culture (see Pavlenko, 
2012). Communication in a foreign language is a common practice in multinational 
companies and international organizations, such as the United Nations, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, whose 
decisions have global impact. A great number of such decisions—Should we impose 
economic sanctions? Should we go to war?—involve a moral evaluation of options. 
Interestingly, a foreign language has been shown to systematically sway moral 
evaluations towards a consequentialist choice (Cipolletti, McFarlane, & Weissglass, 
2015; Costa et al., 2014; Geipel, Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2014). The purpose of this 
article is to empirically access three hypotheses concerning why foreign language 
affects moral judgment. Below we summarize the available evidence, present the 
three hypotheses, and give an overview of the experiments reported in the present 
study. 
Foreign language alters moral judgment: The evidence 
The first studies on foreign language effects on moral judgment employed the 
famous trolley dilemmas (Cipolletti, et al., 2015; Costa et al., 2014; Geipel, 
Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2014). In these dilemmas, participants are informed that a 
runaway trolley is in a course to kill five workmen unless an action is taken. In one 
version of the dilemma—footbridge—the action involves pushing a stranger of a 
footbridge into the path of the trolley. In another—standard trolley—the action 
involves hitting a switch that would redirect the trolley to alternate tracks where one 
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worker is standing. Participants have to decide whether or not it is permissible to 
perform the action. Although these dilemmas are similar at an abstract level—Would 
you kill 1 to save 5?—they are psychologically distinct. The majority of participants 
judge to push the stranger as not permissible, but they find it permissible to hit the 
switch (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene, Cushman et al., 2009; 
Greene, Sommerville et al., 2001; Pellizzoni, Siegal, & Surian, 2010). When these 
dilemmas were described in a foreign language, the endorsement of the action of the 
footbridge dilemma increased, while that of the standard trolley dilemma remained 
unaltered. 
Subsequent research examined the foreign language effect with negative 
actions (Geipel et al., 2015), such as siblings having sex, attenuated by positive 
contextual circumstances, such as the siblings used precautions. The use of a foreign 
language induced less harsh moral evaluations and less confidence in them. These 
findings are important as they show that the foreign language effect is not limited to 
dilemmas involving a numerical tradeoff (1 vs. 5). This work also empirically 
discounted a number of possible explanations for the foreign language effect, such as 
that participants misunderstood the materials, adopted a more universalistic stance, or 
thought that the characters in the scenarios were foreigners. Participants were also 
presented with everyday violations of social and moral norms, such as cutting in line 
when in a hurry, and selling someone a defective car. The use of a foreign language 
induced less harsh moral evaluations even for these commonplace and potentially 
harmful actions.  
Three hypotheses/explanations of the foreign language effects 
Before delving into the hypotheses, we briefly introduce our theoretical 
backdrop, which is the dual-process theory of moral judgment (e.g., Greene et al., 
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2001; 2008). According to this theory, moral judgments result from a competition 
between two systems: a fast, intuitive, affective system and a slow, controlled, 
deliberative system. These two systems are linked to two different modes of moral 
judgment. The intuitive system is linked to a deontological mode of moral judgment, 
which relies on principles such as to avoid harm intentionally caused to innocent 
others. The controlled system is linked to a consequentialist mode of moral judgment, 
which involves acting in a manner as to maximize net benefit. In the case of the 
footbridge dilemma, a deontological perspective would focus attention on the rights of 
the stranger and veto the action, while the consequentialist perspective on the greater 
good and vote for the action. Greene’s dual-process theory explains the typical 
findings with the trolley dilemmas by claiming that when the proposed action prompts 
a strong emotional response—e.g., pushing a person—then the deontological response 
wins. When it doesn’t—e.g., hitting a switch—then the consequentialist response may 
surface. 
In the case of consensual and safe incest between siblings, a deontological 
perspective would focus attention on the violation—incest—and thus trigger a harsh 
moral judgment, while the consequentialist perspective would focus attention on its 
harmless outcome and thus promote a less harsh moral judgment (see Paxton, Ungar, 
& Greene, 2012).1  
Hypothesis 1: Foreign language triggers controlled processes. One possible 
explanation is that foreign language triggers cognitive and emotional distance, which 
in turn promotes controlled processing (Costa et al., 2014; Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 
2012). We call this the controlled processing hypothesis. This hypothesis was 
suggested by the foreign language effect on the trolley dilemmas (Cipolletti et al., 
2015; Costa et al., 2014; Geipel et al., 2014). The increase in controlled processing is 
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felt in the footbridge dilemma because this dilemma typically prompts intuitive 
processing (deontological judgments), but not in the standard trolley dilemma that 
typically triggers controlled processing (consequentialist judgments). The controlled 
processing hypothesis can also explain why foreign language promoted less harsh 
moral evaluations towards negative actions attenuated by positive contextual 
circumstances, such as a man eating his dead dog (Geipel et al., 2015)—because it 
shifted attention to their relatively harmless outcomes (e.g., the dog was dead). 
However, this hypothesis cannot explain why foreign language also decreased 
condemnation of potentially harmful everyday violations of moral and social norms, 
such as selling someone a defective car (Geipel et al., 2015) and why it failed to 
suppress erroneous intuitive responses in non-moral reasoning tasks (Costa et al., 
2014; Geipel et al., 2015).  
Hypothesis 2: Foreign language triggers an abstract mindset. A distinct 
and as yet unexplored possibility is that foreign language influences moral judgment 
by affecting mental representation (Costa, Foucart, Arnon, Aparici, & Apesteguia, 
2014; see also Keysar et al., 2012). A moral situation can be mentally construed on a 
relatively more concrete (focusing on how an action is performed) or abstract way 
(focusing on why an action is performed). Studies suggest that level of construal 
influences ethical evaluations (Gong & Medin, 2012, 2014; Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 
2008, 2014; Žeželj & Jokić, 2014). Gong and Medin (2012), for example, primed 
participants either with an abstract mindset by asking them to respond to a series of 
why questions or with a concrete mindset by asking them to respond to a series of how 
questions. The abstract mindset priming led to more lenient ethical evaluations of 
transgressions, such as eating one’s dead pet (but see Eyal et al., 2008; Žeželj & Jokić, 
2014). Presumably an abstract mindset focuses attention to the contextual 
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circumstances (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2014). Related to the present research, the 
use of a foreign language might influence moral judgment by favoring an abstract 
mindset (see Costa et al., 2014). We call this the abstract mindset hypothesis. This 
hypothesis can directly explain the findings with negative actions attenuated by 
positive contextual circumstances, and potentially also the findings with the trolley 
dilemmas. 
Hypothesis 3: Foreign language acts through the intuitive system. 
According to this hypothesis, using a foreign language distances people from intuition 
and gut-feelings, but the moral machinery remains on intuitive mode (Geipel et al., 
2015). We call this the intuitive processing hypothesis. The idea is that foreign 
language influences moral evaluations by attenuating the aversive signals that 
offensive actions, such as pushing a person or cheating in an exam, automatically 
trigger when printed in a native language (see Haidt, 2001). This attenuation might 
stem from a reduced mental accessibility of moral and social norms (for evidence, see 
Bond & Lai, 1986; Dewaele, 2012; Gawinkowska; Paradowski, & Bilewicz, 2013), 
which are typically learned through social interactions that involve the native 
language. As memories are language specific (e.g., Marian & Neisser, 2000; Schrauf 
& Rubin, 2000, 2004), a foreign language might activate them to a lesser extent.  
This hypothesis can explain the results of the trolley dilemmas, as well as the 
increased leniency towards harmless and harmful violations of social and moral norms 
(Geipel et al., 2015). When printed in a foreign language, intuition sends weaker 
signals that these actions are wrong. It can also explain why foreign language 
decreased confidence in moral evaluations (Geipel et al., 2015). Confidence ratings 
might have tracked the strength of the intuition that these actions are wrong. Finally, it 
can straightforwardly explain the null effect in the non-moral reasoning tasks.  
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Present studies 
The purpose of the present research was to assess these three hypotheses. In 
Study 1, following Geipel et al. (2015), we asked participants to evaluate the 
ethicality of negative actions attenuated by positive contextual circumstances (e.g., a 
manager attempts to unfairly favor an employee, but he fails in doing so). However, 
for the first time, here we also asked participants to justify their evaluations. If foreign 
language prompts controlled processing, then participants should be aware of the 
contents of their moral reasoning (e.g., Darlow & Sloman, 2010). And if participants’ 
moral reasoning concerns the application of utilitarian principles, then their 
justifications should focus on end outcomes (Paxton & Greene, 2010). However, if the 
moral machinery remains on the intuitive mode, then we should observe no difference 
in justifications between the two language conditions. For example, participants 
should be equally unable to justify their responses (moral dumbfounding; Haidt, 
Björklund, & Murphy, 2000). Due to the added cognitive load involved in processing 
information in a foreign language, it could be that a foreign language might increase 
moral dumbfounding.  
In Study 1, we also assessed the abstract mindset hypothesis by means of the 
Behavioral Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). This measure is 
composed of a series of target actions (e.g., Reading an article) followed by two 
restatements: a concrete restatement that emphasizes how the action is performed 
(e.g., Following lines), and an abstract restatement that emphasizes why it is 
performed (e.g., Gaining knowledge). For each target action, participants have to 
choose the restatement that best captures it. If, with respect to the native language, a 
foreign language promotes an abstract mindset, then it should increase the selection of 
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abstract restatements. In Study 2, we further tested this prediction by using a new 
version of the BIF where the target actions are moral violations.  
Study 1 
Methods 
Participants. The participants were 88 German majors from the University of 
Trento (82 females, 6 males, Mage = 20.03 years, age range: 18-28 years).2 Fifty were 
randomly assigned to the foreign language condition and received the entire 
questionnaire in German, and 38 to the native language condition and received it in 
Italian. In all studies, the different language versions of the questionnaires were 
created by bilinguals and double-checked for correctness and equivalence of meaning 
by independent native language judges.  
The majority of participants in the foreign language condition had a B2 
qualification in German (independent user— vantage), with a range from A2 (basic 
user—way stage) to C1 (proficient user—advanced) as specified by the Common 
European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment 
(CEFR; Council of Europe, 2001). Details concerning the participants’ foreign 
language proficiency (for all studies) are presented in Appendix A.  
Materials and procedure. Participants were presented with four moral 
scenarios (see Haidt, 2001; Eyal et al., 2008; Geipel et al., 2015): dog (eating one’s 
dead dog), siblings (siblings having consensual and safe sex), exam (cheating in an 
exam), and bonus (intention to unfairly allocate a bonus among co-workers). They 
were also presented with two control non-moral scenarios which they should judge as 
“perfectly ok” (for the full materials, see Online Appendix). Participants were 
instructed to imagine that the violations took place in Italy and involved Italians.  
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Following each scenario, participants were asked to make a moral judgment 
(“How wrong do you find [action]?”) in a scale from 1 = absolutely ok to 9 = 
absolutely wrong, rate their confidence in that judgment (“How sure are you in your 
evaluation?”) in a scale from 1 = not at all sure to 7 = very sure, rate five emotions in 
response to the scenario (“Thinking about the scenario I just read, I feel upset 
[worried, sad, angry, and disgusted]”) in a 5-point scale (1 = very slightly or not at all, 
2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4 = quite a bit, 5 = extremely), and justify their moral 
evaluations (“Why do you find the [action] morally wrong or morally ok?”) by 
selecting either (a) “I can’t explain why I feel this behavior is morally wrong or not,” 
or (b) “This action is right or wrong because …..” In the emotion rating tasks, the 5-
point scale was adapted from Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988). In the justification 
task, the wording of option (a) was adapted from Uhlmann and Zhu (2014) and its 
selection was coded as a moral dumbfounding response. The presentation order of the 
moral judgment and emotion tasks was counterbalanced. Preliminary analyses 
revealed no order effect, and thus we dropped this factor from the analysis.  
Following these tasks, participants completed part of the Behavior 
Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). They were presented with 12 
target behaviors each followed by a relatively concrete and a relatively abstract 
restatement. Their task was to choose the restatement that best described the target 
behavior.  
Finally, participants in the foreign language condition self-assessed their 
foreign language proficiency and translated the four moral scenarios. Five participants 
mistranslated one item each. We excluded the scores for these items from the analyses 
(including them does not affect the main pattern of findings).  
Results 
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Replicating Geipel et al. (2015, Study 3), we found that the use of a foreign 
language significantly reduced confidence ratings. Due to space restrictions, we will 
not discuss further these results (see Supplementary Materials).  
Moral judgments. We submitted the wrongness ratings of the moral scenarios 
into a 2 (Language) × 4 (Moral scenario) mixed-factor ANOVA. Consistent with 
previous research, the use of the foreign language promoted less harsh moral 
evaluations (M = 7.13, CI [6.76, 7.49]) than the native language (M = 7.91, CI [7.52, 
8.30]), F(1, 79) = 8.46, p = .005, f = .31 (see Figure 1). There was a main effect of 
scenario, F(3, 237) = 16.62, p < .001, f = .45, but no Language × Scenario interaction, 
F(3, 237) = 1.48, p = .221, f = .14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean moral wrongness ratings for each scenario by language condition in 
Study 1. The native language was Italian, and German the foreign language. Error 
bars indicate 95% CIs.  
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A similar analyses performed for the non-moral scenarios showed no 
significant differences between the foreign language condition (M = 0.94, CI [0.53, 
1.35]) and the native language condition (M = 0.66, CI [0.20, 1.12]), F(1, 85) = 0.83, 
p = .366, f = .10. There was no effect of scenario, and no Language × Scenario 
interaction (all ps > .130).  
 Emotion ratings. If foreign language acts through affect, then it should 
decrease emotional ratings for the moral violations. As the five emotion scales were 
highly associated (Cronbach’s alpha = .81), we computed an emotion index by taking 
the mean score over the five scales. We submitted the resulting scores into a 2 
(Language) × 4 (Moral scenario) mixed-factor ANOVA. Participants in the foreign 
language condition indicated similar emotion ratings (M = 3.11, CI [2.93, 3.29]) as 
those in the native language condition (M = 3.04, CI [2.84, 3.24]), F(1, 83) = 0.27, p = 
.607, f = .05. There was a significant main effect of scenario, F(2.56, 212.38) = 34.90, 
p < .001, f = .65, but no Language × Scenario interaction, F(2.56, 212.38) = 0.91, p = 
.437, f = .11.3  
 Dumbfounding. A dumbfounded response (selection of option a.) was coded 
as 1, whereas a justification (selection of option b.; see materials section) as 0. For 
each participant, we calculated a mean dumbfounding score. Overall, participants in 
the foreign language condition were significantly more dumbfounded (M = 0.41) than 
those in the native language condition (M = 0.22), F(1, 85) = 7.63, p = .007, f = .30. 
Individual scenario analyses on the frequency of dumbfounded responses revealed a 
similar pattern (see Figure 2a): bonus (FL: 34.8% vs. NL: 13.2%), χ2 (1, N = 85) = 
5.19, p = .023, φ = .25, exam (FL: 38.3% vs. NL: 13.2%), χ2 (1, N = 85) = 6.73, p = 
.009, φ = .28, dog (FL: 41.3% vs. NL: 34.2%), χ2 (1, N = 85) = 0.44, p = .505, φ = .07, 
and incest (FL: 46.8% vs. NL: 28.9%), χ2 (1, N = 85) = 2.82, p = .093, φ = .18. 
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Moreover, moral dumbfounding increased as language proficiency decreased, r(85) = 
–.34, p = .001. These results challenge the controlled processing hypothesis but are 
consistent with the predictions derived from the intuitive processing hypothesis. 
 Type of justification. We next examined the justifications (how participants 
filled in the blank in option b.; see materials section). Two independent raters, one of 
whom was blind to the hypothesis of the study, coded the justifications as either 
utilitarian (e.g., “the dog was already dead”) or non-utilitarian (e.g., “it is not ok to eat 
pets, they are family members”). An inter-rater reliability analysis showed a high 
consistency between the raters; the Kappa coefficient was .93, p < .001, CI [.455, 
.837]. Inconsistencies were resolved through discussion. Only a minority of 
justifications (6.49%) appealed to consequences (see Figure 2b). Critically, utilitarian 
justifications did not vary across language conditions (FL: 4.84% vs. NL: 8.41%), 
F(1, 75) = 1.23, p = .272, f = .13.  
Behavior Identification Form. The selection of an abstract restatement was 
coded as 1 and that of a concrete restatement as 0. For each participant, we calculated 
an abstract mindset score by summing the scores over the 12 behaviors (there were no 
missing values; min = 0; max = 12). If foreign language promotes an abstract mindset, 
then we should observe higher scores in that condition. This was not the case. The 
means were similar: (MFL = 7.10, CI [6.44, 7.76] vs. MNL = 7.26, CI [6.50, 8.03]), F(1, 
85) = 0.10, p = .748, f = .03. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 1 are consistent with the predictions derived from the 
intuitive processing hypothesis. Replicating previous studies (Geipel et al., 2015), the 
use of a foreign language promoted less harsh moral judgments, and this effect was 
not carried through affect.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of moral dumfounding (a) and percentage of utilitarian 
justifications (b) by scenario and language condition in Study 1. The native language 
was Italian, and German the foreign language. 
 
As proposed by Geipel et al. (2015), the use of a foreign language might instead 
influence moral judgment by reducing the activation of relevant moral and social 
norms. Contrary to the controlled processing hypothesis, we did not observe an 
increase in utilitarian justifications: in both language conditions out of all participants 
that justified their moral evaluations, more than 90% gave a non-utilitarian 
justification. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the use of a foreign language 
increases the incidence of moral dumbfounding. Finally, contrary to the abstract 
mindset hypothesis, we did not observe an increase in the selection of abstract 
restatements in the foreign language condition. 
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In Study 2, as a further test of the abstract mindset hypothesis, we used a 
modified version of the BIF (adapted from Eyal et al., 2008). Instead of using neutral 
target actions (e.g., locking a door), here we used moral violations (e.g., copying in an 
exam). Abstract restatements referred to the relevant abstract moral value (e.g., 
cheating in an exam), whereas concrete restatements to the means of carrying out the 
action (e.g., peeking into another student’s exam). If foreign language promotes an 
abstract mindset, then it should increase the selection of abstract restatements.  
Methods 
Participants. Participants were 73 English major students from the University 
of Trento (60 females, 12 males, 1 unknown, Mage = 22.07 years, age range: 19–64 
years).4 Thirty-seven were randomly assigned to the foreign language condition and 
received the questionnaire in English, and 36 to the native language condition and 
received it in Italian. The majority of participants in the foreign language condition 
had a B2 qualification in English (independent user—vantage), with a range from A2 
(basic user—way stage) to C1 (proficient user—advanced) (CEFR; Council of 
Europe, 2001).  
Materials and Procedure. The target statements were the exam and incest 
items of Study 1 along with two new items: flag (a person cleaning a house using the 
national flag) and hands (a girl eats with her hands) (both adapted from Haidt, Koller, 
& Dias, 1993). Each violation was followed by an abstract and a concrete restatement 
(i.e., Cheating in an exam vs. Peeking into another student’s exam; Incest between 
siblings vs. Sexual intercourse between siblings; Desecrating a national symbol vs. 
Cutting a flag into rags; Disrespecting family rules vs. Picking food with fingers). The 
order of the abstract-concrete restatements was randomized, but the same order was 
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used for all participants. Participants had to choose the restatement that best described 
the target statement. 
Results and Discussion 
 The selection of an abstract restatement was coded as 1 and that of a concrete 
restatement as 0. For each participant, we calculated an abstract mindset score by 
summing the scores over the four items (min = 0; max = 4). Language had no 
influence on mindset: (MFL = 2.00, CI [1.70, 2.29] vs. MNL = 2.00, CI [1.63, 2.33]), 
F(1, 71) < 0.01, p > .999, f < .01. A Mann-Whitney test yielded similar results: 
(MdnFL = 2 vs. MdnNL = 2), U = 660.50, p = .949. We also conducted separate χ2 tests 
for each item comparing the frequency of participants that chose the abstract versus 
concrete restatement between the language conditions. None of the resulting χ2 tests 
was significant (all ps > .50). In sum, the results of Study 2 dovetail with those of 
Study 1 and suggest that foreign language does not influence mindset. 
Study 3 
 In Study 1, we presented participants with negative actions performed under 
attenuating circumstances. Here, for the first time, we investigated instead positive 
actions (e.g., a fashion company donates money to a charity project) whose positive 
value is attenuated by questionable motivations (e.g., the donations was performed to 
improve the company’s reputation). The intuitive processing hypothesis predicts that a 
foreign language will prompt stronger approvals by dampening the aversive reaction 
that the questionable motivations trigger. This could result from a reduced activation 
of the principles that link action evaluation to agents’ underlying motivations (actions 
are good only if performed for the ‘right’ reasons). The abstract mindset hypothesis 
predicts that a foreign language would promote stronger condemnation by focusing 
the attention to their dubious motivations (see Gong & Medin, 2012, Study 3). It is 
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harder to come up with a single prediction for the controlled processing hypothesis. If 
participants become hardline utilitarians, then foreign language should promote more 
positive ethical evaluations, as the end outcomes are positive. But an increase in 
cognitive reflection has been shown to trigger a careful consideration of intentions 
(see Pinillos, Smith, Nair, Marchetto, & Mun, 2011; see also Piaget, 1965). If this 
happens, then it should promote less positive ethical evaluations. As control items we 
included two helping actions (helping a mother in need or a poor man) with no 
mention of motivations, for which we predicted no language effect.  
Methods  
Participants. Participants were 107 volunteers (79 female, 24 male, 3 
unknown; Mage = 25.8 years, age range: 20–59 years).5 Fifty-six native Italian 
speakers completed a paper-and-pencil questionnaire during a lecture, and 51 native 
German speakers completed an online version of the study. The foreign language for 
both groups was English. Preliminary analyses revealed no differences in how foreign 
language influenced moral evaluations in the Italian and German groups, and so we 
combined them. Altogether, there were 47 participants assigned to the native language 
condition (German or Italian), and 60 to the foreign language condition (English).  
Materials and Procedure. Participants judged the moral goodness (0 = not at 
all good, 9 = extremely good) of three target scenarios (the agents’ motivations were 
given) and two control scenarios (the agents’ motivations were not given). The moral 
scenarios involved helping actions underpinned by potentially dubious motivations 
(adapted from Eyal et al., 2008): company (a fashion company donates money to 
charity possibly to increase its profit), inheritance (a wealthy elderly man donates 
money to charity to avoid family quarrels), and adoption (a couple adopts a disabled 
child possibly to receive money from the state). The control scenarios involved 
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helpful actions with no mention of motivations (adapted from Seidel & Prinz, 2012): 
mother (helping a mother with a baby carriage), and poor man (giving money to a 
poor man).  
Results 
We submitted the goodness ratings of the target scenarios to a 2 (Language) × 
3 (Scenario) mixed-factor ANOVA. As predicted by the intuitive processing 
hypothesis, foreign language promoted more positive moral evaluations (M = 6.56, CI 
[6.16, 6.95]) than the native language (M = 5.92,CI [5.48, 6.36]), F(1, 105) = 4.52, p = 
.036, f = .20 (see Figure 3). There was no effect of scenario, F(2, 210) = 0.03, p = 
.971, f < .01, and no Language × Scenario interaction, F(2, 210) = 0.51, p = .602, f = 
.07. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean moral goodness ratings by scenario and language condition in Study 
3. The native language was Italian or German, and English the foreign language. Error 
bars indicate standard errors of the mean.  
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For the control scenarios, a similar analysis revealed no language effect, F(1, 
105) = 0.54, p = .466, f = .07. The foreign language induced similar goodness ratings 
(M = 6.81, CI [6.45, 7.17]) as the native language (M = 7.01, CI [6.60, 7.42]). There 
was an effect of scenario, F(1, 105) = 135.50, p < .001, f = 1.14, but no Language × 
Scenario interaction, F(1, 105) = 3.69, p = .057, f = .19.  
Discussion  
Consistent with the intuitive processing hypothesis, in Study 3 we found that 
the use of a foreign language increases approvals for helpful actions that are tainted 
by dubious motivations. Note that, in contrast to Study 1 and previous studies (Geipel 
et al., 2015), here we found that foreign language induced more extreme ratings with 
respect to the native language. This finding is important because it helps to discount 
an alternative explanation to which previous results were open: The use of a foreign 
language might induce a subjective feeling of uncertainty, which in turn prompts less 
extreme moral judgments (see Geipel et al., 2015). Moreover, the results of Study 3 
challenge the abstract mindset hypothesis that foreign language focuses attention on 
motivations. Had it done so, moral evaluations should have been more negative. 
General Discussion 
We explored three hypotheses concerning how the use of a foreign language 
influences moral judgment: (1) by triggering controlled processing, (2) by promoting 
an abstract mindset, and (3) by reducing aversion towards the morally negative 
aspects of a situation. Challenging the controlled processing hypothesis, foreign 
language not only failed to promote utilitarian justifications but it also increased 
moral dumbfounding (Study 1). In contrast to the abstract mindset hypothesis, foreign 
language did not influence mindset (Studies 1 and 2). The present results are instead 
consistent with the intuitive processing hypothesis. Foreign language promoted more 
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positive moral evaluations (Studies 1 and 3) while justifications remained non-
utilitarian (Study 1). This is a first step in cast light on the processes underpinning the 
foreign language effect on moral judgment. However, the intuitive processing 
hypothesis is admittedly vague and can be seen as a placeholder for a family of more 
specific hypotheses. Below we discuss several possibilities and propose how they 
could be assessed empirically in future investigations.  
One possibility is that a foreign language might promote a positivity bias in 
moral evaluations by triggering more positive affect than the native language (see 
Hadjichristidis, Geipel, & Savadori, 2015). There are two specific proposals of why a 
foreign language might promote a positivity bias. First, reading text in a foreign 
language might trigger automatic protective mechanisms that inhibit access to 
distressing content (Wu & Thierry, 2012). Second, social interaction in the context of 
learning a foreign language preferentially focuses on positive contents (Sheikh & 
Titone, 2015; see also the Pollyanna principle by Boucher & Osgood, 1969). Contrary 
to the proposal that foreign language influences moral judgment by triggering overall 
more positive affect, in Study 1 we failed to detect language differences in several 
emotion scales (see also Geipel et al., 2015, Study 3). The failure to detect such 
differences could be linked to the anchor contraction effect (Langhe de, Puntoni, & 
Osselaer van, 2011), which is the tendency to give more intense emotion ratings when 
the verbal anchors of the scale are presented in a foreign rather than in the native 
language.  
Alternatively, the use of a foreign language might influence intuitive 
processing by reducing access to relevant normative knowledge (Geipel et al., 2015; 
see also Bond & Lai, 1986; Dewaele, 2010; Gawinkowska et al., 2013). Evidence 
comes from a study showing that foreign language promotes less condemnation of 
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violations of everyday social and moral norms such as cutting in line when in hurry 
(Geipel et al., 2015). The present research adds that this effect extends to approvals of 
helpful actions tainted by dubious motives, suggesting a reduced activation also of the 
principles that link action evaluation to agents’ underlying motivations. The use of a 
foreign language might relax the criteria that an action has to meet to be judged as 
‘good’. Consistent with this view, studies outside the domain of moral judgment 
support that the use of a foreign language can reduce culturally transmitted 
restrictions. For example, participants speak longer about embarrassing topics in a 
foreign versus a native language (Bond & Lai, 1986), report to feel their lies less 
strongly (Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-Dinn, 2009), and are more willing to use 
politically incorrect swearwords (Gawinkowska et al., 2013). Similarly, 
psychoanalysts suggested that multilingual patients can display different selves 
depending on the language used during psychoanalysis. Most studies agree that 
anxious memories are deep-rooted in the native language, while a later learned 
language might act as a distancing mechanism (for an excellent review, see Pavlenko, 
2009, Chapter 2). 
A third version of the intuitive processing account focuses on cognitive load. 
Participants in the foreign language condition might have weighed less the agents’ 
intentions in their moral evaluations due to the added cognitive load involved in 
processing information printed in a foreign language (Buon, Jacob, Loissel, & 
Dupoux, 2012). Buon et al. (2012) using animated cartoons examined situations 
where an agent unintentionally causes harm to a victim. In their moral evaluations, 
participants under cognitive load weighted less the absence of a harmful intention 
than did control participants. In brief, the use of a foreign language might reduce the 
import of intentions in ethical judgments. This can explain previous results showing 
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that foreign language increases willingness to sacrifice one person to save five if the 
action involves intentional harm (footbridge dilemma) rather than harm as a side 
effect (standard trolley dilemma; Costa et al., 2014). It can also explain why foreign 
language promoted more lenient moral judgments for offensive actions performed 
under positive contextual circumstances (Study 1; Geipel et al., 2015). This effect was 
particularly evident for the bonus and exam scenarios, both of which explicitly 
involved bad intentions (favoritism, cheating). It also predicts more positive ethical 
evaluations for actions that are ultimately helpful but are backed up by dubious 
intentions since such intentions are weighted less in the foreign language condition, as 
we found in Study 3.  
A crucial prediction of this third account is that a foreign language will not 
always promote a positivity bias in moral evaluations. Consider, for example, 
scenarios involving actions with good intentions (an individual gives a homeless 
person his jacket) and bad outcomes (other people beat the homeless person thinking 
that he had stolen the jacket). Unlike the previous accounts, in this context the 
intention account would predict harsher moral judgment. 
Conclusion 
The present research corroborates previous findings showing that foreign 
language use influences moral evaluations of offensive behaviors performed under 
positive attenuating circumstances. Moreover, it shows that the foreign language 
effect extends to helpful actions performed under negative attenuating circumstances. 
In both cases, the use of a foreign language promoted more positive moral 
evaluations. The present studies challenge the hypotheses that foreign language acts 
by promoting deliberative processes or an abstract mindset. Rather, they suggest that 
foreign language exerts its influence on information processing from the ‘inside’—
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through intuitive pathways. At times this ‘muting’ of intuition can be advantageous, it 
may free judgment and choice from deep-rooted biases such as racial and gender 
stereotypes, while at others it may have a less desirable consequence, it might make 
people more callous towards the suffering of others. 
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Footnotes 
1
 We follow Greene (2014) in using deontological and consequentialist to 
mean “characteristically deontological” and “characteristically consequentialist” as a 
function of response content, not the underlying motivation. 
2
 We conducted an a–priori sample size calculation using G*power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) with the following settings: effect size f = 0.35 
(medium-high, based on Geipel et al., 2015), alpha level = .05, power = .8, number of 
groups = 2 (language conditions), number of repeated measures = 4 (scenarios), 
correlation between repeated measures ρ = 0.46 (based on Geipel et al., 2015). The 
calculation indicated a minimum sample size of 42. Here and throughout we tested 
more participants because the present studies were conducted during classes in which 
a greater number of participants was available. Also, in all studies no interim analyses 
or stopping rules were applied. 
3 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, 
χ
2
 (5, N = 85) = 19.86, p = .001, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .85). 
4 We conducted an a–priori sample size calculation using G*power (Faul et al., 
2007). The parameters were set as follows: effect size f = 0.35 (medium-high, based 
on Geipel et al., 2015), alpha level = .05, power = .8, and number of groups = 2. The 
calculation indicated a minimum sample size of 84.  
5 We conducted an a–priori sample size calculation using G*power (Faul et al., 
2007). The parameters were set as follows: effect size f = 0.31 (medium-high, based 
on Study 1), alpha level = .05, power = .95, number of groups = 2, number of repeated 
measures = 3, and correlation between repeated measures ρ = 0.38 (based on Study 1). 
The calculation indicated a minimum sample size of 86. 
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Appendix A 
Details of Participants in the Foreign Language Conditions. 
Table A.1  
Details of Participants In The Foreign Language Conditions. 
Note. a Participants self-assessed their German language skills in terms of reading and 
understanding, each on a 5-point scale (1 = almost none, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 
5 = very good; scale adapted from Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-Dinn, 2009). Here we 
report the mean rating across the two items. b Participants evaluated their English 
language skills in terms of conversational fluency, reading, writing, and 
understanding, each on a 5-point scale (1 = almost none, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 
5 = very good). We report the mean rating across these scales. c We asked participants 
to rate how well they understood each scenario on a 6-point scale ranging from 50% 
(some understanding) to 100% (excellent understanding).
 Means, 95% CI 
Study 1 (n = 50)  
Start age of  
German education   
 
  11.26, [9.91, 12.72] 
Self-ratings of  
language skills in Germana 
 
    3.65, [3.41, 3.89] 
Study 2 (n = 37)b  
Start age of  
English education  
 
  8.80, [8.00, 9.69] 
Self-ratings of  
language skills in Englishb 
 
 
  3.79, [3.64, 3.93] 
Study 3 (n = 60)b  
Start age of  
English education  
 
  8.40, [7.76, 8.98] 
Self-ratings of  
language skills in Englishb 
 
  3.89, [3.72, 4.06] 
Self-ratings of  
comprehension of the materialsc 
 
  95%, [94%, 97%] 
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Abstract 
As a result of globalization, policy makers and citizens are increasingly 
communicating in a foreign language. This article investigates whether 
communicating in a foreign language influences lay judgments of risk and benefit 
regarding specific hazards such as “traveling by airplane,” “climate change,” and 
“biotechnology.” Merging findings from bilingual and risk perception research, we 
hypothesized that stimuli described in a foreign language, as opposed to the native 
tongue, would prompt less negative overall affect and through that induce lower 
judgments of risk and higher judgments of benefit. Two studies support this foreign 
language hypothesis. Contrary to recent proposals that foreign language influences 
judgment by promoting deliberate processing, we show that it can also influence 
judgment through emotional processing. The present findings carry implications for 
international policy, such as UN decisions on environmental issues.  
 Keywords: risk perception, judgment and decision-making, affect heuristic, 
bilingualism, foreign language. 
Chapter 5: Foreign Language and Risk Perception 
 
 
130 
 
The effect of foreign language on judgments of risk and benefit:  
The role of affect 
 
Lay perceptions of risk and benefit underpin personal decisions, such as 
whether to take up regular exercising, which influence wellbeing. Lay perceptions of 
risk and benefit also affect public policy and spending at national level. For instance, 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency has found that its policies depend 
more on lay perceptions of risk rather than on expert assessments (Sunstein, 1999, p. 
8). Policy making and regulation at an international level, such as by the United 
Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, or the 
International Risk Governance Council, frequently involve communication and 
distribution of official documents in a foreign language, mostly English. Here we ask 
whether judgments of risk and benefit about a stimulus, such as “nuclear power 
plant,” vary as a function of the language in which the stimulus is described. Merging 
findings from two distinct areas of psychology, we expect that they will. Research on 
risk perception suggests that subjective assessments of risk and benefit are influenced 
by the overall affect, positive or negative, that the verbal description of a stimulus 
activates (e.g., Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; see also Zajonc, 1980). 
Research on bilingualism suggests that reading words in a foreign language activates 
less affect—predominantly less negative affect—than reading their translation 
equivalents in the native language (e.g., Caldwell-Harris, 2014; Pavlenko, 2012; Wu 
& Thierry, 2012). 
The Role of Affect in Judgments of Risk and Benefit 
Theories on the perception of risk and benefit, and judgment and decision 
making at large, emphasize a dual process route (e.g., Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & 
Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). One route is emotional 
and automatic (risk as feelings), while the other is analytic and slow (risk as analysis). 
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A prominent theory suggests that the emotional route works prevalently through the 
affect heuristic (e.g., Slovic et al., 2002). According to this view the verbal 
description of a stimulus automatically triggers mental images and thoughts that are 
associated with affect, positive or negative (see also Damasio, 1994). Judgments 
depend on the overall affect that a stimulus activates, especially when judgments are 
complex and/ or the mental resources of the judge are limited. If the overall affect is 
positive, this signals safety and the stimulus is judged as high-benefit and low-risk. If 
it is negative, this signals alarm and the stimulus is judged as low-benefit and high-
risk.  
In support of the affect heuristic, Alhakami and Slovic (1994) have shown that 
risk/ benefit judgments are inversely related in people’s minds, even if they may be 
positively associated in the environment. Follow-up research by Finucane and 
colleagues (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000, Study 1) demonstrated that 
such an inverse relation is strengthened under time pressure, which supports that the 
underpinning mechanism is fast, emotional processing, rather than slow, analytic 
processing (see Maule & Svenson, 1993). A second study by Finucane and colleagues 
(2000, Study 2) demonstrated that information about risks influences judgments about 
benefits and vice versa, which further supports the idea that risk and benefit 
judgments are tied together and based on an overall affective evaluation. Inverse 
relations between judgments of risk and benefit have also been shown in experts’ 
judgments (see Ganzach, 2001, for evidence with financial analysts, Slovic, 
MacGregor, Malmfors, & Purchase, 1999, for evidence with toxicology experts, and 
Savadori et al., 2004, for evidence with biotechnology experts). The effect of 
emotions on risk perception seems pervasive as it is also found in randomly sampled 
behaviors from everyday life (Hogarth, Portell, Cuxart, & Kolev, 2011). In summary, 
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empirical evidence suggests that perceptions of risk and benefit are related to the 
overall affect that a verbal description of a stimulus activates. 
Foreign Language and Affect  
Bilingual research suggests that emotional words and phrases have less 
emotional force when printed in a foreign language as opposed to the native language 
(e.g., Caldwell-Harris, Tong, Lung, & Poo, 2012; Harris, Gleason, & Ayçiçeği, 2006; 
for reviews see Caldwell-Harris, 2014; Pavlenko, 2012). For example, Harris and 
colleagues (Harris et al., 2006) demonstrated that native Turkish speakers who 
learned English after the age of seven (late Turkish-English bilinguals), respond with 
lower autonomic arousal to childhood reprimands such as “Shame on you!” when 
these are presented in their native language (Turkish) than a later learned language 
(English) (see also Harris, Ayçiçeĝi, Gleason, 2003). In the same vein, Caldwell-
Harris and Ayçiçeĝi-Dinn (2009) found that late Turkish-English bilinguals report 
feeling their lies less strongly in a later learned language than in their native language. 
Neuroimaging studies further specify that foreign language preferentially attenuates 
the emotional resonance of negative words. For instance, Wu and Thierry (2012) 
found that while reading a positive or neutral word in a foreign language activates its 
native language equivalent, a negative word does not. The authors attributed this 
finding to automatic emotional processes that inhibit access to distressing content. As 
Wu and Thierry eloquently put it, reading in a foreign language protects your heart. 
The Foreign Language Hypothesis for Judgments of Risk and Benefit 
We hypothesized that presenting a target stimulus like “pesticides” in a 
foreign language as opposed to the native language might also protect your heart—its 
overall affect might become less negative. To the extent that this is true, on the basis 
of the affect heuristic we predicted that foreign language would prompt higher 
Chapter 5: Foreign Language and Risk Perception 
 
 
133 
 
judgments of benefit and lower judgments of risk. This prediction rests on the 
assumption that judgments of risk and benefit in a foreign language would also be 
based on automatic, emotional processing. However, it could be that the attenuation 
of emotions that accompanies processing information in a foreign language might 
instead promote analytical thinking (see Costa, Foucart, Hayakawa, et al., 2014; 
Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 2012). That is, a switch from the native language to a 
foreign language might trigger a switch from emotional to analytic processing. If this 
happens, we should find weaker (inverse) relations between risk and benefit 
judgments in a foreign language than in the native language, since such (inverse) 
relations are underpinned by emotional processes (e.g., Finucane et al., 2000).  
In brief, if our foreign language hypothesis is correct, then we should observe 
a cross-over interaction between language condition and risk/benefit judgments: In 
relation to the native language, foreign language should prompt higher judgments of 
benefit and lower judgments of risk. Furthermore, the correlation between risk—
benefit judgments should be significant and negative in both language conditions. 
Instead, if foreign language prompts analytic processing, the negative correlation 
between risk—benefit judgments should be weaker in the foreign language condition. 
This alternative hypothesis makes no predictions about the relation between risk and 
benefit judgments across languages. 
Study 1 
We examined these hypotheses by presenting participants with 26 activities, 
substances, technologies, and environmental issues, asking them to rate each one in 
terms of perceived risk and perceived benefit (we used 21 stimuli from Finucane et 
al., 2000, Study 1, and introduced 5 novel stimuli; for the full list of items see 
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Appendix). Half of the participants received the entire questionnaire in a foreign 
language (English), whereas the other half in their native language (Italian).  
Methods 
Participants. A sample of 92 Italian students (77 female, 14 male, 1 
unknown; Mage = 22.91 years, age range: 20–30 years) from the Department of 
Languages and Literature of the University of Verona voluntarily participated at the 
beginning of an English lesson.1 Participants were tested in three different classes. 
Preliminary analyses revealed no main effect of class, and thus the data were 
collapsed across this factor. Participants were randomly assigned either to the foreign 
language condition (n = 46) and received a questionnaire entirely written in English, 
or to the native language condition (n = 46) and received the same questionnaire in 
Italian.  
All participants were English majors, with a minimum qualification of a First 
Certificate in English. We wanted to ensure that they would understand the materials. 
On average, participants in the foreign language condition began English education at 
age 8.87, 95% CI [8.28, 9.39]. These participants were also asked to self-rate their 
English proficiency in terms of conversational fluency, reading, writing, and 
understanding, on a 5-point scale (1 = almost none, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = 
very good). Averaging across the four measures (Cronbach’s α = .79), they rated their 
English skills as good (M = 4.14, 95% CI [3.99, 4.29]). 
Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to rate 26 specific hazards 
such as “travelling by airplane,” “pesticides,” and “nanotechnology,” in terms of risk 
and benefit for Italian society as a whole (instructions adapted from Finucane et al., 
2000, Study 1). For each item, participants had to rate its risk (benefit) on a 7-point 
scale (1 = absolutely not risky [beneficial], 2 = not risky [beneficial], 3 = slightly risky 
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[beneficial], 4 = moderately risky [beneficial], 5 = fairly risky [beneficial], 6 = very 
risky [beneficial], 7 = extremely risky [beneficial]). The risk and benefit judgments 
were presented in separate blocks, and the order of their presentation was 
counterbalanced within each language condition. Within each block, the 26 target 
items were presented in a different random order. Following these tasks, participants 
completed a set of demographic questions. Participants in the foreign language 
condition additionally responded to questions concerning their English proficiency. 
Results  
Judgments of risk and benefit. The main results are illustrated in Figure 1 
and support the cross-over interaction predicted by the foreign language hypothesis: 
In relation to the native language, foreign language triggered lower judgments of risk 
and higher judgments of benefit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean ratings of risk and benefit by language condition (Study 1). Error bars 
indicate standard error of the means.  
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We ran two 2 (language condition: foreign language vs. native language) × 2 
(type of judgment: risk vs. benefit) analyses of variance, one treating subjects as a 
random factor (F1), the other treating items as a random factor (F2). The ANOVA by 
subjects revealed no main effect of language condition, F1(1, 90) = 0.25, p = .616, f = 
0.03. There was a main effect of type of judgment, F1(1, 90) = 8.44, p = .005, f = 0.31. 
Overall, ratings of risk (M = 4.13, 95% CI [4.02, 4.24]) were higher than ratings of 
benefit (M = 3.84, 95% CI [3.71, 3.97]). Importantly, as predicted by the foreign 
language hypothesis, there was a significant judgment × language interaction, F1(1, 
90) = 5.14, p = .026, f = 0.24. Overall, participants in the foreign language condition 
(FL) gave marginally lower ratings of risk than participants in the native language 
condition (NL) (MFL = 4.03, 95% CI [3.88, 4.19]; MNL = 4.23, 95% CI [4.08, 4.38]), 
F(1, 90) = 3.15, p = .079, d = 0.37, and significantly higher ratings of benefit (MFL = 
3.97, 95% CI [3.79, 4.16]; MNL = 3.71, 95% CI [3.53, 3.89]), F(1, 90) = 4.04, p = 
.047, d = 0.41. 
The ANOVA by items revealed similar results. There was no main effect of 
language, F2(1, 25) = 0.75, p = .396, f = 0.17, but here also no effect of type of 
judgment, F2(1, 25) = 0.32, p = .576, f = 0.11. As predicted by the foreign language 
hypothesis, there was a significant judgment × language interaction, F2(1, 25) = 
26.23, p < .001, f = 1.02. With respect to the native language, items in the foreign 
language condition received lower ratings of risk (MFL = 4.04, 95% CI [3.48, 4.59]; 
MNL = 4.23, 95% CI [3.69, 4.76]), t(25) = -3.83, p = .001, d = 0.14, 95% CI [-0.29, -
0.09], and higher ratings of benefit (MFL = 3.96, 95% CI [3.40, 4.53]; MNL = 3.71, 
95% CI [3.16, 4.26]), t(25) = 3.98, p = .001, d = 0.19, 95% CI [0.12, 0.39].2  In 
summary, the only robust effect across the analyses by subjects and items was the 
cross-over interaction.  
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Risk-benefit correlations. If affective processes underpin judgments of risk 
and benefit in both language conditions, then we would expect high (negative) risk—
benefit correlations. However, if foreign language triggers a switch from emotional to 
analytic processing, then the risk—benefit correlation should be weaker in the foreign 
language than in the native language condition. Consistent with the former 
hypothesis, the correlation between risk and benefit judgments across the 26 items 
(item means on item means) was high and negative within each language condition, -
.91 for the foreign language condition and -.91 for the native language condition. We 
also computed separate correlations across the 26 items, one for each participant. The 
mean of these correlations across was -.68 for the foreign language condition (range: -
.94 to -.34) and -.72 for the native language condition (range: -.94 to -.12), t(82) = 
1.15, p = .252, d = 0.24, 95% CI [-.03, .11]. Importantly, the risk—benefit 
correlations were negative for all participants (see ranges), which provides strong 
support for the affect heuristic.  
In summary, the results of Study 1 are consistent with the proposed foreign 
language hypothesis. With respect to the native language, foreign language decreased 
judgments of risk and increased judgments of benefit. Moreover, in both language 
conditions risk—benefit judgments were strongly and inversely associated, which 
implies that they were underpinned by emotional processes. The latter finding 
challenges the alternative hypothesis that foreign language prompts analytical 
thinking. 
Study 2 
The foreign language hypothesis rests on the assumption that a stimulus 
triggers overall less negative affect when described in a foreign language as opposed 
to the native language (see Wu & Thierry, 2012). The primary aim of Study 2 was to 
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assess this assumption directly by gathering measures of affect. In the case it did, a 
more specific aim was to determine whether the foreign language effect on judgments 
of risk and benefit is mediated by affect. We presented a new sample of participants 
with the 26 items of Study 1 and asked them for judgments of risk and benefit, either 
in their native language (Italian) or a foreign language (English). We additionally 
asked participants to rate each item in terms of positive and negative feelings. We 
expected that the overall affect ratings would be less negative in the foreign language 
than in the native language condition, and that this difference would mediate the 
effect of foreign language on risk and benefit judgments. 
Methods 
Participants. A total of 123 adults (60 female, 63 male; Mage = 25.33 years, 
age range: 19 – 43 years) were recruited by e-mail distribution lists of the University 
of Trento and voluntarily took part in the online survey.3 Of those, 59 were randomly 
assigned to the foreign language condition (English) and 64 to the native language 
condition (Italian). Three participants assigned in the foreign language condition self-
rated their English skills as very poor, and thus were excluded from subsequent 
analyses (including these participants does not alter the pattern of the findings). We 
report results from the remaining 120 participants. All participants in the foreign 
language condition had a First Certificate in English. On average, they began English 
education at age 10.95, 95% CI [10.05, 11.90]. Averaging across conversational 
fluency, reading, writing, and understanding (Cronbach’s α = .84), participants in the 
foreign language condition rated their English skills as good (M = 4.00, 95% CI [3.86, 
4.15]).  
Materials and procedure. The materials for the risk and benefit judgment 
tasks were similar to those of Study 1. Participants were presented with the same 26 
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items and assessed each one in terms of risk and benefit on the same 7-point scale (1 
= absolutely not risky [beneficial], 7 = extremely risky [beneficial]). However, in 
Study 2 participants in the foreign language condition were also offered the option, “I 
don’t understand this item,” to ensure that eventual findings are not due to a lack of 
understanding. The questions about risk and benefit were presented in separate 
blocks, and the questions within each block were presented in a different random 
order. In addition, as a third block, participants were asked to rate their positive and 
negative feelings (in that order) towards the 26 items. For example, participants read: 
“Thinking about nuclear power plants, I have…” followed by “positive feelings” and 
then “negative feelings.” Participants had to rate each type of feeling on a 5-point 
scale (1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4 = quite a bit, 5 = extremely; from 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
Within each language condition participants received these three tasks in one 
of four counterbalancing orders (risk judgments followed by benefit judgments and 
emotion ratings, benefit judgments followed by risk judgments and emotion ratings, 
emotion ratings followed by risk and benefit judgments, emotion ratings followed by 
benefit and risk judgments). Finally, participants responded to a set of demographic 
questions. Those in the foreign language condition additionally responded to 
questions about their foreign language proficiency.  
Results 
Judgments of risk and benefit. The main findings are illustrated in Figure 2 
and show the cross-over interaction predicted by the foreign language hypothesis. 
Replicating the findings of Study 1, with respect to the native language, foreign 
language triggered lower judgments of risk and higher judgments of benefit. As in 
Study 1, we ran two 2 (language) × 2 (type of judgment) ANOVAs, one by subjects 
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(F1) and another by items (F2). The analysis by subjects revealed no main effect of 
language, F1(1, 118) = 0.24, p = .628, f = 0.05, or type of judgment, F1(1, 118) = 0.13, 
p = .718, f = 0.08. However, as predicted, there was a significant judgment × language 
interaction, F1(1, 118) = 7.56, p = .007, f = 0.25. Participants in the foreign language 
condition gave lower ratings of risk than those in the native language condition (MFL 
= 3.96, 95% CI [3.81, 4.12]; MNL = 4.22, 95% CI [4.09, 4.35]), F(1, 119) = 6.56, p = 
.012, and marginally higher ratings of benefit (MFL = 4.16, 95% CI [3.98, 4.33]; MNL 
= 3.97, 95% CI [3.84, 4.10]), F(1, 119) = 3.13, p = .08. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Mean ratings for risk and benefit judgments by language condition (Study 
2). Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
The results from the items analysis were similar. There was no main effect of 
language, F2(1, 25) = 1.27, p = .271, f = 0.22, or type of judgment, F2(1, 25) = 0.01, p 
= .929, f = 0.00, but a significant judgment × language interaction, F2(1, 25) = 25.62, 
p < .001, f = 1.01. Overall, with respect to the native language, in the foreign language 
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items received lower ratings of risk (MFL = 3.97, 95% CI [3.51, 4.46]; MNL = 4.22, 
95% CI [3.79, 4.71]), t(25) = -4.69, p < .001, d = -0.20, 95% CI [-0.36, -0.14], and 
higher ratings of benefit (MFL = 4.13, 95% CI [3.62, 4.62]; MNL = 3.97, 95% CI [3.45, 
4.45]), t(25) = 3.07, p = .005, d = 0.12, 95% CI [0.06, 0.28].4 
Risk-benefit correlations. Based on the foreign language hypothesis and the 
results of Study 1, we expected high negative correlations between risk and benefit 
judgments in both language conditions. This is what we found. The correlation 
between risk and benefit judgments across the 26 items (item means on item means) 
was -.89 in the foreign language condition and -.91 in the native language condition. 
We also computed separate correlations across the 26 items, one for each participant. 
The mean of these correlations was -.63 (range: -.94 to -.11) in the foreign language 
condition, and -.68 (range: -.96 to -.08) in the native language condition, t(118) = -
1.59, p = .115, d = -0.28, 95% CI [-.12, .01]. As in Study 1, the correlation between 
risk and benefit judgments was negative for all participants, which supports the affect 
heuristic. 
 Positive and negative feelings. Our foreign language hypothesis rests on the 
assumption that a stimulus triggers less negative overall affect when described in a 
foreign language than in the native language. The main results are illustrated in Figure 
3 and are broadly consistent with this prediction. They point to a cross-over 
interaction: mean negative feelings were lower in the foreign language than in the 
native language condition, while the reverse was true for positive feelings. We 
analyzed the data with a two 2 (language) × 2 (type of feelings) ANOVAs, one by 
subjects (F1) and another by items (F2). The analysis by subjects revealed a marginal 
effect of language condition, F1(1, 118) = 3.19, p = .077, f = 0.16. Participants in the 
foreign language condition gave slightly higher ratings (MFL = 2.78, 95% CI [2.69, 
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2.87]) than those in the native language condition (MNL = 2.67, 95% CI [2.58, 2.75]). 
There was also a significant main effect of type of feelings, F1(1, 118) = 9.04, p = 
.003, f = 0.28. Overall, participants rated the items as evoking more positive feelings 
(M = 2.79, 95% CI [2.72, 2.87]) than negative feelings (M = 2.65, 95% CI [2.57, 
2.73]). Importantly, there was a significant feeling × language interaction, F1(1, 118) 
= 27.96, p < .001, f = 0.49. Overall, participants in the foreign language condition 
gave significantly higher ratings of positive feelings than participants in the native 
language condition (MFL = 2.97, 95% CI [2.85, 3.10]; MNL= 2.61, 95% CI [2.52, 
2.71]), F(1, 118) = 22.33, p < .001, f = 0.43, and slightly lower ratings of negative 
feelings (MFL = 2.59, 95% CI [2.48, 2.70]; MNL = 2.72, 95% CI [2.60, 2.84]), F(1, 
118) = 2.54, p = .113, f = 0.15.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean ratings of negative and positive feelings by language condition (Study 
2). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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The item analysis yielded similar results. There was a significant main effect 
of language condition. Overall, items received higher ratings when described in the 
foreign language (MFL = 2.78, 95% CI [2.72, 2.84]) than in the native language (MNL 
= 2.67, 95% CI [2.60, 2.73]), F2(1, 25) = 24.27, p < .001, f = 0.99. In this analysis 
there was no main effect of type of feelings, F2(1, 25) = 0.19, p = .670, f = 0.08. 
Importantly, there was a significant feeling × language interaction, F2(1, 25) = 32.58, 
p < .001, f = 1.14. Overall, with respect to the native tongue, in the foreign language 
items received higher ratings of positive feelings (MFL = 2.98, 95% CI [2.59, 3.36]; 
MNL = 2.61, 95% CI [2.28, 2.95]), t(25) = 7.39, p < .001, d = 0.41, 95% CI [0.26, 
0.46]), and significantly lower ratings of negative feelings (MFL = 2.59, 95% CI [2.25, 
2.93]; MNL = 2.72, 95% CI [2.41, 3.03]), t(25) = -2.67, p = .013, d = -0.16, 95% CI [-
0.23, -0.03].  
In summary, consistent with the foreign language hypothesis, the target stimuli 
were rated overall less negatively when described in the foreign language than in the 
native language. However, this effect was not driven by the mechanisms suggested by 
bilingual research, that is, an attenuation of negative feelings (this attenuation was 
significant only in the analysis by items). Instead, it was mostly driven by an 
amplification of positive feelings. We discuss reasons for this apparent inconsistency 
in the General Discussion. 
Correlations between judgments-feelings. On the basis of our foreign 
language hypothesis we expected highly positive correlations between risk 
judgments—negative feelings and benefit judgments—positive feelings, and highly 
negative correlations between risk judgments—positive feelings and benefit 
judgments—negative feelings. This is what we found. The correlation between risk 
judgments—negative feelings (item means on item means) in the foreign language 
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and the native language conditions were respectively, .95 (p < .001) and .92 (p < 
.001). The correlation between risk judgments—positive feelings in the foreign 
language and the native language conditions were respectively, -.87 (p < .001) and -
.88 (p < .001). The corresponding correlations between benefit judgments—positive 
feelings were, .92 (p < .001) and .93 (p < .001). Finally, the corresponding 
correlations between benefit judgments—negative feelings were, -.93 (p < .001) and -
.92 (p < .001).  
We also computed separate correlations across the 26 items, one for each 
participant. The mean correlation across participants between risk judgments—
negative feelings in the foreign language and the native language conditions were 
respectively,  .67 (range: .21 to .94) and .63 (range: -.21 to .92). The mean 
correlations between risk judgments—positive feelings in the foreign language and 
the native language conditions were respectively, -.60 (range: -.92 to -.25) and -.58 
(range: -.94 to .16). The corresponding mean correlations between benefit 
judgments—negative feelings were -.65 (range: -.95 to .11) and -.61 (range: -.93 to 
.22). Finally, the corresponding mean correlations between benefit judgments—
positive feelings were .69 (range: .14 to .92) and .67 (range: -.37 to .95).  
Multiple mediation analysis. To test the hypothesis that affect mediates the 
foreign language effect in risk and benefit judgments, we ran two multiple mediation 
analyses using the INDIRECT macro by Preacher and Hayes (2008), one for 
judgments of risk and another for judgments of benefit. In both, the predictor was 
language (foreign language = 1, native language = 0), and the mediators were 
positive/ negative feelings (5-point scales, with higher ratings indicating more 
positive/ negative feelings). We used a bootstrapping procedure based on 5000 
bootstrapped re-samples. 
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Risk judgments. The main findings are illustrated in Figure 4. As predicted, 
taken together, positive and negative feelings mediated the effect of language on risk 
judgment. The total and indirect effects of language on risk judgment were 
respectively, -0.25 (p = .012) and -0.06 (p = .557). The total indirect effect through 
the mediators (positive and negative feelings) had a point estimate of -0.19 and a 95% 
BCa bootstrap CI of -0.34 to -0.06. As Figure 4 illustrates, foreign language was 
associated with increased positive feelings and decreased negative feelings, which in 
turn were related with lower ratings of risk. An examination of the specific indirect 
effects indicates that only positive feelings was a significant mediator, since its 95% 
CI does not contain zero, -0.29 to -0.03.    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 4. Mediation model illustrating the association between language (FL = 
foreign language, NL = native language) and risk perception as mediated by positive 
and negative feelings. *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Benefit judgments. The main findings are illustrated in Figure 5. As was the 
case with risk judgments, together positive and negative feelings mediated the effect 
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of language on benefit judgments. The total and indirect effects of language on benefit 
judgment were respectively, 0.19 (p = .079) and -0.11 (p = .295). The total indirect 
effect had a point estimate of 0.30 and a 95% BCa bootstrap CI of 0.18 to 0.48. Figure 
5 illustrates that foreign language is associated with greater positive feelings and 
lower negative feelings, which in turn are related to higher judgments of benefit. An 
examination of the specific indirect effects indicates that only positive feelings was a 
significant mediator, since its 95% CI does not contain zero, 0.14 to 0.43. 
 In summary, Study 2 replicated the main findings of Study 1 and provided 
direct evidence that foreign language influences risk and benefit judgment through 
emotions. With respect to the native language, foreign language attenuated negative 
emotions and  amplified positive emotions, and this net increase in positive affect 
mediated the foreign language effect in judgments of risk and benefit. 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mediation model illustrating the association between language (FL = 
foreign language, NL = native language) and benefit judgment as mediated by 
positive and negative feelings.  †p < .08, **p < .01. 
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Discussion 
The language in which a stimulus is described influences its judged risk and 
benefit. Describing a stimulus in a foreign language, as opposed to the native 
language, decreased judgments of risk and increased judgments of benefit. 
Furthermore, in both language conditions judgments of risk and benefit were 
underpinned by emotional processing. This is implicitly supported by the finding that 
judgments of risk/ benefit were inversely associated (Study 1, 2) and directly 
supported by the finding that each type of judgment was highly associated with 
ratings of negative/ positive feelings in the expected manner (Study 2). Importantly, 
the effect of foreign language on judgments of risk and benefit was mediated by affect 
and specifically by a net increase in positive feelings (Study 2). The present 
hypothesis is novel and was predicted by merging evidence on the affect heuristic 
with evidence from bilingual studies: Target stimuli elicit overall less negative affect 
when printed in a foreign language as opposed to the native language, which leads to 
comparatively lower risk and higher benefit judgments. 
 We also considered an alternative hypothesis: foreign language prompts 
analytical thinking. This hypothesis predicts that foreign language would lead to 
weaker associations between risk—benefit judgments as well as weaker associations 
between such judgments and feelings. But all such associations were similarly strong 
across the language conditions. This alternative hypothesis has been proposed to 
account for evidence showing that foreign language reduces several decision biases 
(see Costa, Foucart, Arnon, et al., 2014; Costa, Foucart,  Hayakawa, et al., 2014; 
Keysar et al., 2012). Specifically, foreign language reduced framing effects 
(participants were less swayed by whether outcomes were described in terms of gains 
or losses), and increased risky choice (participants selected more often risky options 
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over safer options in a context where risky options had a higher expected value). 
Moreover, foreign language promoted utilitarian moral choices (participants accepted 
more often actions that involved sacrificing one person to save five), which has been 
linked to a controlled mode of thinking (e.g., see Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). In respect to existing literature, a novelty of the present 
research is that it shows that foreign language can influence judgment through 
emotional processing.  
 Curiously, all types of judgment that foreign language has been shown to 
influence (framing effects, risky choice, moral judgment) are associated with the 
negativity bias: a tendency in humans and animals to weigh negative events more than 
positive events (for excellent reviews see Rozin & Royzman, 2001, and Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Consider people’s tendency to prefer safe 
bets with lower expected values over riskier bets with higher expected values. This 
tendency can be explained in terms of overweighting negative outcomes (e.g., 
maximum loss) with respect to positive outcomes (e.g., maximum win). A similar 
explanation can be offered for people’s reluctance to sacrifice one person (negative 
outcome) to save five other persons (positive outcome). Could it be that foreign 
language reduces the negativity bias or, equivalently, triggers a positivity bias? The 
present findings support this hypothesis by showing that foreign language increases 
overall positive feelings. Furthermore, Wu and Thierry (2012) provide a possible 
mechanism that does not implicate controlled processes: foreign language activates 
automatic processes which suppress access to distressing emotional content. Future 
studies could address the proposed link between foreign language and negativity bias 
by investigating, for instance, whether foreign language diminishes other instances of 
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this bias such as magical thinking (e.g., people’s reluctance to eat fudge cake that 
looks like feces, see Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986).  
A surprising finding in our studies was that foreign language increased 
positive feelings. This runs counter to bilingual research, which suggests that foreign 
language either diminishes positive feelings or leaves them unaltered (for a review see 
Pavlenko, 2012). For instance, Dewaele (2008) using introspective reports found that 
the phrase “I love you” is felt more intensely in the native language than in a foreign 
language. The cause of this inconsistency might be traced to the different stimuli 
used. Most bilingual studies used stimuli that are either all-positive (e.g. “love”) or 
all-negative (e.g. “death.”) We purposefully used complex stimuli (e.g. “travelling by 
airplane”) that have both negative associations (e.g. accidents) and positive 
associations (e.g. holidays.) (Interestingly, the negativity bias is strong precisely for 
such complex stimuli, see Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Now just as judgments of risk/ 
benefit tap on the overall affect that a stimulus triggers, subjective ratings of positive/ 
negative feelings might also do. Concretely, when a person judges positive feelings 
she might take into consideration not only the positive associations but also the 
negative associations that the stimulus activates.5 In this view, the results from the 
positive/ negative scales should be taken only as a general indication that foreign 
language sways the balance of feelings toward the positive side.  
But why was the increase in positive feelings higher than the decrease in 
negative feelings? Recent research has shown that when the endpoints of  emotional 
scales are described in a foreign language, as opposed to the native language, they 
support more extreme ratings (de Langhe, Puntoni, Fernandes & van Osselaer, 2011). 
The idea is that the anchors of emotional scales (e.g. “extremely happy”) are less 
intensely experienced when they are described in a foreign language (see, e.g., 
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Pavlenko, 2012). Because of that, judges compensate by selecting higher ratings. In 
relation to the present studies, such a tendency would promote higher ratings in the 
foreign language condition for both negative and positive feelings. In the case of 
negative feelings this tendency works against our hypothesis (we predict a decrease in 
negative feelings). Thus the observed decrease in negative feelings might have been 
an underestimation, whereas the increase in the positive feelings an overestimation. 
Future research could circumvent this problem by representing emotional states via 
pictograms which are less susceptible to such tendencies (see de Lange et al., 2011, 
Study 8), or by using other measures like electrodermal responses or facial affect. 
A possible limitation of the present studies concerns the languages used. 
Based on anecdotal evidence, it is likely that the foreign language (English) was 
perceived as less emotional than the native language (Italian) (see Puntoni, de Langhe, 
& van Osselaer, 2009). Differences in language emotionality should pull both positive 
and negative feelings toward the same direction. However, foreign language 
increased ratings for positive feelings and decreased ratings for negative feelings (at 
least in the analysis by items). In general, we do not believe that the present findings 
are language specific. Bilingual research has registered systematic differences 
between a later learned language and the native language, using a wide array of 
language combinations, as well as balanced designs (for a review, see Pavlenko, 
2012). The effects of foreign language on judgment and decision making have 
similarly proven robust with respect to the languages and even the cultures used (e.g., 
Costa, Foucart, Arnon, et al., 2014; Costa, Foucart,  Hayakawa, et al. 2014; Keysar et 
al., 2012; Puntoni et al., 2009). 
In conclusion, we have shown that hazards printed in a foreign language rather 
than in the native language are perceived as less risky and more beneficial. 
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Communicating in a foreign language is a commonplace activity in international 
organizations, such as UN, NATO, and EEC, and multinational companies. Such 
organizations make decisions pertaining to managing and communicating risk, which 
have global-reaching consequences. Consider UN agreements on climate change, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol, or NATO decisions on how to tackle perceived threats. 
Can foreign language also influence such decisions? It might, since experts’ 
judgments of risk also rely on feelings (e.g., Slovic et al., 1999; Sunstein, 1999). 
Communication in a foreign language might promote a less negative affective 
impression of a hazard and hence decrease impetus toward corrective measures. 
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Footnotes 
1To estimate the appropriate sample size, we ran an a-priori sample size 
calculation using the software package G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007). We used the following settings: statistical power = .80, effect size 
f = .25 (medium effect) p = .05 (traditional criterion of statistical significance), 
number of groups = 2 (foreign language, native language), number of 
measurements = 2 (risk, benefit), correlation between repeated measures ρ = −0.4 
(estimated). The total sample size suitable to detect effects of a within by between 
participants factors interaction under these conditions would be 90.  
2For risk judgments 19 out of 26 items showed the expected pattern of 
means (MFL < MNL), while for benefit judgments 20 out of 26 items showed the 
expected pattern of means (MFL > MNL) (see Appendix, Table 1). In each case the 
percentage of hits is higher than what would be expected by chance (for both p < 
.05, by binomial test). 
3We ran an a-priori sample size calculation using the software package 
G*power (Faul et al., 2007). We used the following settings: statistical power = 
.80, effect size f = .24 (medium effect, based on Study 1), p = .05 (traditional 
criterion of statistical significance), number of groups = 2 (foreign language, 
native language), number of measurements = 2 (risk, benefit), correlation between 
repeated measures ρ = −0.7 (based on Study 1). The total sample size suitable to 
detect effects of a within by between participants factors interaction under these 
conditions is 118.   
4For risk judgments 20 out of 26 items showed the expected pattern of 
means (MFL < MNL), while for benefit judgments 18 out of 26 items showed the 
expected pattern of means (MFL > MNL) (see Appendix, Table 2). In each case the 
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percentage of hits is higher than what would be expected by chance (for both p < 
.05, by binomial test). 
5This is supported by the extremely high negative correlations between 
negative and positive feelings (foreign language: r = -.95; native language: r = -
.92, item means on item means). 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
Mean Ratings of Risk and Benefit Judgments for Each Item by Language Condition in 
Study 1. Pairs of Means that are Consistent With our Hypothesis are Highlighted in 
Boldface. 
ITEMS  
English 
 
Italian 
RISK BENEFIT 
Foreign L. 
M (SD) 
Native L. 
M (SD) 
Foreign L. 
M (SD) 
Native L. 
M (SD) 
Food preservatives Conservanti alimentari 3.57 (1.29) 3.78 (0.96) 3.72 (1.38) 2.83 (1.16) 
Cars Automobili 4.43 (0.98) 4.67 (1.06) 4.85 (1.41) 3.96 (1.61) 
Incinerators Inceneritori 5.09 (1.29) 5.09 (1.13) 3.20 (1.52) 2.93 (1.45) 
Alcoholic beverages Bevande alcoliche 5.17 (1.22) 5.26 (1.14) 2.59 (1.28) 2.24 (0.95) 
Industrial 
production plants  
Impianti di produzione 
industriale 4.71 (1.25) 5.59 (1.07) 3.11 (1.56) 2.80 (1.41) 
Eating beef Mangiare carne di manzo 2.72 (1.22) 3.04 (1.33) 4.39 (1.44) 4.13 (1.31) 
Cigarettes Sigarette 6.26 (0.95) 6.13 (1.00) 1.46 (0.91) 1.27 (0.58) 
Pesticides Pesticidi 5.41 (1.20) 5.52 (1.26) 2.83 (1.24) 2.39 (1.04) 
Explosives Esplosivi 6.17 (1.08) 6.37 (0.77) 1.91 (1.11) 1.87 (0.83) 
Cellular phones Telefoni cellulari 4.22 (1.50) 4.35 (1.10) 4.96 (1.53) 4.50 (1.41) 
Roller blades Pattini in linea 2.42 (1.01) 2.93 (1.37) 3.93 (1.34) 4.17 (1.25) 
Nuclear power 
plants Impianti nucleari 5.76 (1.06) 6.35(0.90) 2.56 (1.46) 2.70 (1.65) 
Food irradiation Irradiazione di alimenti 5.69 (1.38) 5.66 (1.28) 2.51 (1.47) 2.23 (1.29) 
Traveling by 
airplane Viaggiare in aereo 3.30 (1.28) 3.50 (0.91) 5.22 (1.43) 4.89 (1.34) 
Windsurfing Fare windsurf 3.15 (1.12) 3.28 (1.13) 4.54 (1.44) 4.78 (1.17) 
Swimming pools Piscine 2.33 (0.94) 2.67 (0.97) 5.74 (1.20) 5.43 (1.09) 
Solar energy Energia solare 1.70 (0.92) 2.09 (1.03) 6.41 (0.88) 6.11 (0.88) 
Railroads Ferrovie 3.17 (1.18) 2.96 (0.92) 5.11 (1.42) 5.20 (1.11) 
Motorcycles Motociclette 4.41 (1.20) 4.63 (1.16) 3.83 (1.24) 3.54 (1.15) 
Chemical fertilizers Fertilizzanti chimici 4.93 (1.18) 5.24 (1.15) 2.93 (1.20) 2.43 (0.91) 
Nanotechnology Nanotecnologie 2.62 (1.42) 2.98 (1.14) 5.40 (1.39) 4.59 (1.41) 
Microwave ovens Forni a microonde 3.74 (1.34) 3.50 (1.07) 3.89 (1.61) 3.87 (1.20) 
Bicycles Biciclette 2.20 (0.86) 2.54 (1.24) 6.02 (1.27) 6.09 (0.84) 
Biotechnology Biotecnologie 2.46 (1.22) 2.67 (0.99) 5.72 (1.17) 5.04 (1.21) 
Climate change Cambiamento climatico 5.61 (1.54) 5.46 (1.26) 1.87 (1.22) 2.11 (1.04) 
Natural gas Gas naturali 3.65 (1.65) 3.61 (1.15) 4.37 (1.58) 4.29 (1.36) 
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Table 2 
Mean Ratings of Risk and Benefit Judgments for Each Item by Language Condition in 
Study 2. Pairs of Means that are Consistent With our Hypothesis are Highlighted in 
Boldface. 
ITEMS  
English 
 
Italian 
RISK BENEFIT 
Foreign L. 
M (SD) 
Native L. 
M (SD) 
Foreign L. 
M (SD) 
Native L. 
M (SD) 
Food preservatives Conservanti alimentari 3.73 (1.36) 4.06 (1.13) 3.98 (1.69) 3.23 (1.27) 
Cars Automobili 4.66 (1.08) 4.47 (0.91) 4.71 (1.50) 4.86 (1.48) 
Incinerators Inceneritori 4.93 (1.27) 4.92 (1.38) 3.49 (1.51) 3.38 (1.60) 
Alcoholic beverages Bevande alcoliche 4.84 (1.29) 4.78 (1.03) 2.80 (1.31) 2.89 (1.21) 
Industrial 
production plants  
Impianti di produzione 
industriale 4.74 (1.32) 5.37 (1.13) 3.49 (1.67) 3.22 (1.41) 
Eating beef Mangiare carne di manzo 2.94 (1.22) 3.25 (1.27) 3.94 (1.31) 4.14 (1.46) 
Cigarettes Sigarette 5.77 (1.22) 6.06 (0.91) 1.52 (0.71) 1.61 (0.90) 
Pesticides Pesticidi 5.43 (1.14) 5.61 (1.06) 3.18 (1.43) 2.61 (1.29) 
Explosives Esplosivi 6.04 (1.18) 5.75 (1.37) 2.78 (1.50) 2.67 (1.36) 
Cellular phones Telefoni cellulari 3.73 (1.23) 4.55 (1.17) 4.75 (1.31) 4.59 (1.55) 
Roller blades Pattini in linea 2.54 (0.93) 2.92 (1.21) 4.94 (1.34) 4.45 (1.72) 
Nuclear power 
plants Impianti nucleari 5.57 (1.25) 5.94 (1.27) 2.94 (1.86) 2.59 (1.49) 
Food irradiation Irradiazione di alimenti 5.09 (1.0) 5.88 (1.09) 2.49 (1.39) 2.23 (1.14) 
Traveling by 
airplane Viaggiare in aereo 3.05 (0.96) 3.44 (1.14) 5.32 (1.56) 5.14 (1.40) 
Windsurfing Fare windsurf 2.67 (1.07) 3.16 (1.18) 5.07 (1.44) 4.95 (1.47) 
Swimming pools Piscine 2.36 (0.91) 2.61 (0.97) 5.44 (0.95) 5.37 (1.18) 
Solar energy Energia solare 2.05 (0.94) 2.13 (1.25) 6.25 (1.01) 6.41 (0.81) 
Railroads Ferrovie 2.93 (1.16) 3.02 (1.09) 5.70 (1.21) 5.41 (1.24) 
Motorcycles Motociclette 4.75 (1.25) 5.02 (1.22) 4.00 (1.36) 3.94 (1.10) 
Chemical fertilizers Fertilizzanti chimici 4.82 (1.22) 5.16 (1.13) 3.29 (1.42) 2.72 (1.27) 
Nanotechnology Nanotecnologie 2.59 (1.14) 2.84 (1.14) 5.56 (1.25) 5.03 (1.26) 
Microwave ovens Forni a microonde 3.63 (1.34) 4.05 (1.35) 3.38 (1.34) 3.81 (1.34) 
Bicycles Biciclette 2.55 (1.09) 2.75 (1.36) 6.22 (0.94) 6.16 (1.10) 
Biotechnology Biotecnologie 2.73 (1.17) 2.69 (1.17) 5.73 (1.20) 5.23 (1.18) 
Climate change Cambiamento climatico 5.34 (1.39) 5.55 (1.25) 2.00 (1.04) 2.03 (1.20) 
Natural gas Gas naturali 3.73 (1.24) 3.67 (1.30) 4.52 (1.44) 4.42 (1.41) 
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Chapter 6 
General Discussion 
 
In this essay I explored whether the use of a foreign language as compared to 
the native language influences moral evaluation and risk perception. I found that it 
influences both types of judgments. In terms of moral judgments, the use of a foreign 
language increased consequentialist type judgments in the trolley dilemmas (Chapter 
2), decreased wrongness judgments towards relatively harmless but offensive moral 
transgressions (Chapters 3 and 4), and increased moral goodness judgments for 
positive actions (Chapter 4). Importantly, the use of a foreign language also promoted 
leniency towards potentially harmful everyday norm violations (Chapters 3 and 4). In 
terms of risk and benefit perception, the use of a foreign language increased benefit 
judgments and decreased risk judgments (Chapter 5).  
The present essay also examined the psychological processes that underpin the 
foreign language effect in each of these domains. The findings suggest that foreign 
language exerts its influence through intuitive processes. In moral judgment, foreign 
language influenced judgments by suppressing the activation of sociocultural and 
moral norms, whereas in risk and benefit perception it exerted an influence through 
affect. Below I will present a detailed account for why foreign language suppresses 
norms and attenuates emotions. But first I will discount an alternative proposal which 
holds that foreign language effects result from the selective activation of controlled 
processing. 
Costa and colleagues (Costa et al., 2015) examined the trolley dilemmas and 
found that foreign language increased the rate of consequentialist type judgments. 
Their findings mirror those presented in Chapter 2. Following Greene and colleagues’ 
dual process model of moral judgment (e.g., Greene et al., 2001, 2008), Costa and 
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colleagues (2014) explained their findings by suggesting that the use of a foreign 
language attenuates emotional responses and increases controlled processing. If their 
hypothesis is correct then we should also expect improved performance in logical 
tasks that typically trigger an intuitive, incorrect response. In Chapter 3 and 4 my 
coauthors and I tested one such task, the Moses illusion (e.g., Erickson & Mattson, 
1981). We found that the use of a foreign language failed to improve performance. 
Furthermore, if Costa and colleagues’ (Costa et al., 2014) hypothesis were correct, 
then the use of a foreign language should decrease moral dumfounding, which stands 
for the inability to justify one’s moral judgment (e.g., Haidt, 2001). The idea is that if 
participants had arrived at a moral evaluation through deliberation, then they should 
be aware of the contents of their thoughts (e.g., Sloman, 1996). But we found just the 
opposite—the use of a foreign language increased moral dumbfounding. Still, one 
could argue that this just proves that the participants in the foreign language condition 
were “lazy” and decided not to provide reasons. But even if we focus on participants 
that provided justifications, their justifications were predominantly deontological with 
no differences between the language conditions. This result is not consistent with the 
controlled processing hypothesis, which predicts a higher rate of consequentialist type 
justifications in the foreign than in the native language.  
In terms of risk perception, once again, the results speak against the hypothesis 
that using a foreign language increases controlled thinking. As examined and 
discussed in Chapter 5, my coauthors and I found that the effect of foreign language 
on risk and benefit perception was mediated by affect. In each language condition the 
correlations among positive/negative feelings and risk/benefit ratings (item means on 
item means) were extremely high (in absolute values the correlations were higher than 
.90). These results are instead congruent with the hypothesis that judgments of risk 
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and benefit were underpinned by the affect heuristic. That is, they were underpinned 
by intuitive rather than controlled processing. 
Why did foreign language influence risk and benefit judgments and moral 
judgments via different routes? Why foreign language did not influence moral 
judgments through affect? One possibility is that emotions do play a role in the 
foreign language effect on moral judgment but we were unable to detect this for 
methodological reasons. Specifically, in these studies we measured emotions with 
scales, which were not supplemented with graphic icons. Because of this, the results 
were susceptible to the anchor contraction effect, which refers to the tendency to 
assign more extreme values when the anchors of a scale are labeled in a foreign 
language than in the native language (see de Langhe, Puntoni, Fernandes, & van 
Osselaer, 2011). Notice that this tendency goes in the opposite direction to the 
predicted effect, that is, a decrease in moral wrongness judgments. Future studies 
could address this by using emoticon scales of affective valence or more direct 
measures of affect such as facial expressions.  
A further possibility why emotions did not exert an influence in moral 
judgment is that moral judgments are more complex than the risk and benefit 
judgments we tested. For example, moral judgments involve a consideration of the 
intentions of an agent (for a review, see Young & Tsoi, 2013). Furthermore, moral 
judgments involve two types of affect: affect associated directly to an action (e.g., 
pushing a person) and affect associated to the outcomes (e.g., saving five people; see 
Cushman, 2013). For example, it could be that the foreign language effect on moral 
judgment is underpinned by action-based affect. Future studies could address this 
hypothesis by asking specific questions about action-based affect (How do you feel 
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about pushing the stranger off the bridge?), rather than generic questions like the ones 
we used in the present studies (e.g., How did the scenario made you feel?)  
Roots of the foreign language effect 
 Throughout this essay I made the claim that the use of a foreign language 
influences judgment and decision-making through intuitive processes. Below I present 
two ways of how this could happen. First, I discuss the language-dependent memory 
account. Second, I discuss the depleted cognitive recourses account. But before I 
unpack these two accounts, I want to explain what I mean by intuition. By intuition I 
refer to associative memory. This involves ideas and connections between ideas (see 
Kahneman, 2011). Ideas are construed broadly and include words such as nouns, or 
adjectives, but also concepts of words, emotions and facial expressions. Consider, for 
example, the words Christmas tree. It will automatically activate some images and 
memories, which in turn will activate others. These images and memories (e.g. 
family) might also trigger associated feelings (e.g., warmth). But why should the use 
of a foreign language influence intuitive processing? 
Language-dependent memory 
One answer comes from studies on bilingualism and autobiographical memory 
(e.g., Schrauf & Rubin, 2001, 2004; Marian & Neisser, 2000; Larsen, Schrauf, 
Fromholt & Rubin, 2002; Marian & Kaushanskaya, 2007; Schrauf & Durazo-Arvizu, 
2006). These studies suggest that memories are more likely to be retrieved if they are 
probed by the language in which the original event was encoded (e.g., Schrauf & 
Rubin, 2001, 2004; Marian & Neisser, 2000). This is called the language specificity 
effect. For example, Marian and Neisser (2000) asked Russian native speakers who 
later immigrated to the United States to recall specific life events that were prompted 
by some words such as holiday, summer, or blood. They found that when asked in the 
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native language Russian, participants retrieved more experiences from the Russian-
speaking period of their lives. In contrast, when asked in the later learned language, 
English, participants retrieved more experiences from the English-speaking period of 
their lives.  
Other studies have shown that memories that are retrieved by the language of 
encoding are more detailed and emotional (e.g., Marian & Kaushanskaya, 2007). This 
refers to the language congruity effect. Given that most of our personal and social-life 
experiences involve communication in the native language, processing information in 
a foreign language may trigger images and memories, and their emotional 
associations less forcefully. In other words, the associative memory might activate a 
less rich network of ideas when processing information in a foreign language as 
compared to the native language. 
This could explain why moral and sociocultural norms may be less accessible 
in a foreign language as compared to the native language. Normative knowledge, such 
as knowledge in the domain of harm and fairness, is learned and experienced early in 
life through social interaction (e.g., Shaw & Olson, 2012). Typically verbal 
communications about prohibitions and obligations (e.g., “Do not lie!”, “Do not throw 
the paper on the floor!”) are in the native language and involve the primary caregivers 
(e.g., Rottman & Young, 2015). As a result of language specificity and language 
congruency, moral and social norms may be less activated in a foreign language as 
compared to the native language. Because of that, moral and social norms might exert 
less influence on moral judgment. This could directly account for the present findings 
with moral judgment. 
Language-dependent memory could also explain the foreign language effect 
on risk and benefit perception. When reading, for example, “travelling by airplane” in 
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the native language one might activate a richer network of mental representations than 
when reading it in a foreign language. Relatedly, in a native language the affective 
associations of a stimulus might be more prominent than in the foreign language. But 
to explain the results we need the additional assumption that the use of foreign 
language preferentially attenuates negative rather than positive associations. This 
could be the case because negative associations have fewer opportunities to be 
emotional grounded than positive associations (Sheikh & Titone, 2015), or because 
the use of a foreign language triggers automatic processes that supress access to 
distressing content (Wu & Thierry, 2012).  
Cognitive load 
Another, possibly complementary, reason why processing information in a 
foreign language may influence judgment and decision-making is cognitive load. 
Processing information in a foreign language requires cognitive resources (e.g., Volk 
et al., 2013). The increased cognitive load, in turn, may interfere with the ability to 
access moral and sociocultural norms, which would explain the results with moral 
judgment. It may also interfere with the ability to extract and process emotional 
information, which would partly explain the results with risk and benefit judgments. 
Below I discuss empirical evidence that supports these claims. 
Studies have shown that cognitive load influences moral judgment (e.g., Buon, 
Jacob, Loissel, & Dupoux, 2013; Fonseca, Brauer, Moisuc, & Nugier, 2013). For 
example, Fonseca and colleagues (Fonseca et al., 2013) found that participants under 
cognitive load react ineffectively to moral norm violations. These results are in line 
with the evidence discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, which demonstrated that when using 
a foreign language participants judge potentially harmful moral norm violations more 
leniently. It could also explain the results with the footbridge dilemma. It could be 
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that reading this dilemma in a foreign language introduces cognitive load, which in 
turn interferes with the accessibility of the relevant moral norm (“Don’t push 
people!”), and thus promotes consequentialist type judgments. An increased cognitive 
load could also explain the observed correlation between proficiency and moral 
judgment (for further evidence, see Costa et al., 2014). Recall that as proficiency 
increased, the gap in moral judgment between the foreign and native language 
conditions decreased. The reason for this could be that as proficiency increases, the 
burden placed on cognitive resources to comprehend the foreign language text 
decreases. 
The cognitive load account could also explain the results on risk and benefit 
judgments. Studies have shown that cognitive load interferes with emotional 
processing. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, Van Dillen and 
colleagues (Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, & Koole, 2009) presented participants with 
neutral and negative stimuli and subsequently induced cognitive load by means of a 
concurrent arithmetic task. They found that cognitive load impaired the brain’s 
reaction to negative stimuli (e.g. distressed faces) in regions that are typically 
associated with emotional processing. Crucially, participants under cognitive load 
indicated to feel less emotional in response to negative stimuli.  
Similarly, Kron and colleagues (Kron, Schul, Cohen, & Hassin, 2010) 
investigated whether cognitive load influences the intensity of feelings. Participants 
counted backwards while watching emotional pictures, and subsequently rated their 
feelings. Kron et al. (2010) found that negative feelings were attenuated under 
cognitive load. These authors explain their findings with the mere resource 
hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the experience of feelings is a mental act that 
necessitates mental resources, resources that are depleted by simultaneous cognitive 
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tasks. This depletion of mental recourses decreases the intensity of feelings. It could 
be that foreign language processing has a similar effect, which could explain in part 
the findings with risk and benefit perception. 
Moreover, several theoretical accounts have linked cognitive load with other 
types of mental experiences such as vividness (e.g., Andrade, Kavanagh, & Baddeley, 
1997; Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Could it be that reading information in a foreign 
language reduces the mental experience of vividness? Support for this idea comes 
from research demonstrating that cognitive load influences the vividness of 
memorized images (e.g., Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Baddeley and Andrade (2000), 
for example, asked participants to rate the vividness of visual and auditory stimuli 
while performing concurrent tasks such as counting. They found that cognitive load 
decreased the perceived vividness of the stimuli. 
Vividness is typically defined as how concrete or imaginable something is, but 
can also refer to how emotional something is. A series of studies demonstrated that 
vividness influences judgment and decision-making (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). For 
example, in the domain of morality, Bartels (2008; see also Amit & Greene, 2012) 
found that increased vividness promoted deontological type judgments. This is 
consistent with the present findings in moral judgment. When moral dilemmas or 
transgressions are presented in the native language, as opposed to the foreign 
language, they might be perceived as more vivid, and thus promote deontological type 
judgments. To the extent that vividness is dissociable from emotional reactions, it 
could also explain why in the present studies we found no association between moral 
judgment and emotion ratings—the mediator could have been vividness. This 
vividness hypothesis could also account for the present findings about risk and benefit 
perception, as studies have shown a positive association between vividness and risk 
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perception (e.g., Traczyk, Sobkow, & Zaleskiewicz, 2015). Future studies could try to 
disentangle the role of vividness from that of emotionality in explaining the foreign 
language effect on judgment and decision-making. 
In the previous sections I discussed two accounts through which the use of a 
foreign language may influence judgment and decision-making: the language specific 
memory account, and the increased cognitive load account. These accounts could also 
explain other foreign language effects on judgment and decision-making. For 
example, they can explain Keysar and colleagues’ (Keysar et al., 2012) finding that 
the use of a foreign language reduces decision-making biases such as framing effects. 
Framing effects refer to the tendency of people to respond differently depending on 
whether the outcomes of an option are presented in terms of gains or losses (for 
reviews, see Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; see also Kühberger, 1998). 
Specifically, when the outcomes are presented in terms of gains participants are 
typically risk averse (they prefer a sure gain over a probabilistic gain of the same 
expected value) whereas when they are presented in terms of losses participants are 
typically risk seeking (they prefer a probabilistic loss over a certain loss of the same 
expected value). Keysar and colleagues (Keysar et al., 2012) found that framing 
effects disappeared in a foreign language. They explained their findings in terms of 
increased systematic processing due to the reduced emotional resonance of losses in a 
foreign language. I claim that an attenuation of negative emotions suffices to explain 
these findings.  
Does foreign language help or hurt judgment and decision-making? 
One may wonder whether using a foreign language helps or hurts decision-
making. I believe that the answer is not straightforward, but depends on the type of 
judgment or decision. Consider, for example, the foreign language effect on risk and 
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benefit perception. For some activities, such as smoking, using a foreign language 
might be hurtful. It would make people perceive such activities as less harmful and 
more beneficial than they actually are. However, the use of a foreign language could 
be used strategically, as a nudging technique (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), to promote 
adoption of beneficial technologies. My colleagues and I have recently conducted a 
study (Geipel & Hadjichristidis, 2015) wherein we presented participants with a 
description of recycled water, stating that one of its sources is toilet wastewater 
(Rozin, Haddad, Nemeroff, & Slovic, 2015). Participants indicated whether they 
would be willing to drink recycled water and how comfortable they would feel in 
doing so. The use of a foreign language increased both the willingness to drink 
recycled water and ratings of comfort. In this particular case, using a foreign language 
was beneficial. It helped participants break a psychological barrier, which stopped 
them from embracing a beneficial technology. 
In another study (Hadjichristidis, Geipel, & Surian, 2015), we presented 
participants with situations that included positive or negative superstitious 
circumstances, such as seeing a falling star or seeing a black cat crossing the street. 
We found that using a foreign language neutralized participants’ feelings towards 
these circumstances. That is, the use of a foreign language reduced the influence of 
irrational beliefs. The root of this effect might be associative memory. Just like moral 
norms, positive and negative superstitions are transmitted to us typically during 
childhood through socialization in the native language (e.g., see Vyse, 1997). Because 
of that, reading about superstitious entities in the foreign language might activate less 
these culturally rooted fears. 
Another potentially positive effect of processing information in a foreign 
language is that it might promote self-regulation. Research suggests that when 
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cognitive load is introduced early it interferes with the recognition of tempting 
stimuli, thus enhancing self-regulation (Van Dillen, Pappies, & Hoffman, 2013). 
When it is introduced late, it interferes with the wilful suppression of temptation, thus 
hindering self-regulation (e.g., Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). In the case of foreign 
language processing, cognitive load is introduced early—it is inherent to processing a 
foreign language.  
Support for this claim comes from a study by Klesse and colleagues (Klesse, 
Levav, & Goukens, 2015). They asked native German speakers to (orally) order a 
dessert in a restaurant (fruit or cake) either in their native language or in English. 
Ordering in a foreign language resulted in healthier food selections. Furthermore, if it 
is true that foreign language attenuates temptation, then it could also have beneficial 
outcomes in other domains, such as inter-temporal choices about retirement decisions 
or investments. Individuals might be more willing to trade money today for a better 
life in the future, because they would be less impatient to spend money now.  
Moreover, the use of a foreign language could potentially reduce prejudice. 
Studies have shown that an early introduction of cognitive load interferes with the 
relative accessibility and application of stereotypes (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). For 
example, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) presented white female students with Asian 
targets. Participants who were exposed to the Asian target while rehearsing an eight-
digit number showed no evidence of stereotype activation, whereas those who were 
not cognitively busy did show stereotype activation. The use of a foreign language 
could have a similar inhibition effect on the accessibility of stereotypes. The use of a 
foreign language might prove beneficial, for example, in the context of employee 
selection. By presenting information in a foreign language, the activation of certain 
stereotypes might be reduced leading to improved employee selection.  
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In sum, in some case the use of a foreign language might be helpful whereas in 
others it might be hurtful. This will depend strongly on the task in question. Certain 
intuitions, such as ethical norms, provide important guides for judgments and 
decisions. Hushing moral intuitions might hinder performance. However, in other 
cases (e.g. prejudice; magical thoughts) intuitive signals might be misleading, and so 
overcoming them would be beneficial. 
Limitations 
One limitation of the present research concerns the sample, which included 
mostly students (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). In future studies, it would 
be interesting to investigate more representative samples of the general population. It 
would also be interesting to examine whether the foreign language effects extend to 
experts, such as employees of multinational companies, diplomats of international 
organizations, or international medical staff. If the foreign language effects extend to 
experts then these effects would be of great applied significance. For instance, the use 
of foreign language could affect international public policy, which in turn affects all 
of us. 
 Another limitation of the present studies concerns the setting of the 
experiments. Most of the present experiments were conducted in controlled settings 
such as in classrooms. Such contexts might not simulate well the environment where 
typically the use of a foreign language may influence judgment and decision-making. 
In more naturalistic situations, such as in the work environment of multinational 
companies, the use of a foreign language might have different effects. For example, it 
is likely that in work environments there would be high demands on cognitive 
resources (Volk et al., 2014). For this reason it would be particularly important to 
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conduct future studies in more naturalistic environments such as in multinational 
companies.  
 Furthermore, the present research investigated stated choices or ratings. It 
remains an open question whether foreign language effects would extend to behaviour 
and action. For example, the increase in leniency towards everyday moral norm 
violations (e.g., cut in line if in a hurry) might suggest that the use of a foreign 
language would translate into unethical behaviours. But this might not always be the 
case. Some tasks require more cognitive resources than others, and for these tasks it 
could be that the use of a foreign language might instead promote rather than hinder 
ethical behaviour (see Veer, Stel, & Beest, 2014). Veer and colleagues asked 
participants to privately roll a die three times and report the outcome either under high 
cognitive load or low cognitive load. Depending on what they rolled participants 
could receive more or less money. Therefore these experiment created a motivation to 
lie. They found that high cognitive load reduced false reporting. The authors 
concluded that in this particular task dishonest behaviour requires more cognitive 
resources than honest behaviour. To the extent that foreign language increases 
cognitive load, then I would expect that it would also promote ethical behaviour.  
This is precisely what Bereby-Meyer and colleagues found (Bereby-Meyer et 
al., 2015). Using the same task as Veer et al. (2014), participants anonymously rolled 
a die and were paid accordingly to their reported outcome. Bereby-Meyer and 
colleagues found that using a foreign language as compared to the native language in 
this task resulted in less dishonest behaviour. This result supports the claim that 
foreign language use may increase cognitive load, thus leaving no cognitive capacities 
to serve one’s self-interests by lying. It also shows that the effect of foreign language 
is malleable, and depends on several factors. 
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A further limitation of the present studies is that we present no direct evidence 
in regards to the hypothesis that the use of a foreign language may suppress the 
activation of sociocultural and moral norms. Future studies could address this 
hypothesis by using word completion tasks and/ or lexical identification tasks. The 
idea is that if in a foreign language norms/rules are less activated than in the native 
language, then participants should be less likely to complete words (D_T_) in such a 
way as to signify moral-related concepts (DUTY), and be less fast in identifying 
words related to morality. In regards to the emotion attenuation account, we do 
present direct evidence that affect mediates risk/benefit judgments. However, it would 
be interesting to examine whether this effect would also manifest with more implicit 
measures, such as facial expressions while reading the moral dilemmas.  
Conclusion 
 In this essay I examined whether and why reading information in a foreign 
language, as compared to the native language, influences moral judgment and choice 
and the perception of risk and benefit. I provided empirical evidence supporting that 
the use of a foreign language promotes consequentialist type judgments in trolley type 
dilemmas, and more lenient moral judgments towards both offensive but harmless 
transgressions and potentially harmful social and moral norm violations. The results 
suggest that the underpinning mechanism might be a reduced activation of 
sociocultural and moral norms. In relation to risk and benefit perception, the use of a 
foreign language increased the perception of benefit and decreased the perception of 
risk. This effect was mediated by a more positive affective valence of hazards in a 
foreign language.  
In our globalized society, the use of a foreign language is a commonplace 
activity for millions of people. Studying how communication in a foreign language 
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affects judgment and decision-making is an exciting and significant line of research. I 
have presented preliminary results demonstrating that the use of a foreign language 
can sway judgment and choice. Future studies should focus on the underlying 
mechanisms, but they should also examine the impact that using a foreign language 
has in everyday life such as at work or home environments. Communicating in a 
foreign language not only helped Helmut Newton to overcome his blunter, but as we 
speak could be affecting all of us by shaping international policy. 
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